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REVIEW ESSAY
TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION. By Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge, Massachussetts:
Harvard University Press, 1996. Pp. 347. $35.00.
LAW AND TRUTH. By Dennis Patterson. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996. Pp. 182. $39.95.
Reviewed by Michael C. Dof*
In Freedom's Law, ProfessorRonald Dworkin asserts that the constitutional provisions that protect individual rights embody moral principles,
thus requiringinterpretersto conduct a "moralreading"of the Constitution.
ProfessorDorfargues that Dworkin does not always persuadethat his moral
readings of particularclauses are correct, but that Dworkin does set forth a
potentially powerful method for interpretingthe entire Constitution.
Dorf draws upon Dworkin's previous writings to show that the moral
reading is best understood as an application of Dworkin's view of law as
integrity. Under that view, ajudge decides a case by choosing the interpretation that best fits the whole of our legal tradition, with principlesof political
morality playingan importantrole in this process. Dorf considersDworkin's
claim that the moral readingproduces right answers even in hard cases in
light of the postmodern critiqueof ultimate truth, as exemplified by Professor
Dennis Patterson'sLaw and Truth. Although Dorffinds a metaphysical
difference between the postmodern view and law as integrity, he maintains
that the two theories yield the same interpretive method.
Dorfquestions the utility ofDworkin'sspecific applicationsof the moral
reading in cases involving individual rights because Dworkin's arguments
appearunlikely to persuade readers who do not sharehis views on contested
moral issues such as abortion or the right to die. In those areas where disagreement does not so clearly rest on differences aboutfirstprinciples, however,
the moral reading is more compelling. Dworkin'sjustificationfor the moral
readingsupports extending its use to all constitutional interpretation. The
moral reading, Dorfconcludes, has greatpotential in areas that Freedom's
Law does not explore.
* Associate Professor, Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful for the
comments and suggestions of David Charny, Sherry Colb, Jeffrey Gordon, John Manning,
Henry Monaghan, Gerald Neuman, Dennis Patterson, Joseph Raz, Charles Sabel, Allan
Stein, and Kendall Thomas. Christian Halliburton provided valuable research assistance
and Scott Semer's editorial work was outstanding.
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INTRODUCTION
During his long and distinguished career, Ronald Dworkin has
championed a broad collection of claims about Anglo-American jurisprudence. Principal among these are: that there really are right answers in
hard cases;' that the law consists of not only rules with an on/off character but also principles that must be weighed; 2 that rights do not derive
their content from consequentialist judgments but have a deontological
status; 3 that judges decide hard cases by attempting to put the law in its
best possible light, given past practice and principles of political morality;4 and that despite appearances to the contrary, contemporary society
in fact manifests widespread consensus about basic moral propositions.5
Dworkin's latest book, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution, at first may appear to be less ambitious than some
of his earlier works. On the surface, Freedom's Law merely collects a variety of previously published essays on a number of constitutional issues.
Uniting the essays, however, is a claim no less broad than those upon
which Dworkin has made his reputation. He argues that the abstract
guarantees of the United States Constitution-especially its prohibition
on deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process, its guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and its protection of freedom of
speech-should be read as embodying moral principles rather than political compromises. 6 The moral reading, as Dworkin would have judges
practice it, requires that particular decisions be justified by reference to
principles of political morality. In Freedom's Law, as in his earlier works,
Dworkin argues both for his approach to constitutional interpretationsome moral reading-and for his implementation of that approach-a particular moral reading. This Essay examines both aspects of Dworkin's
7
project.
Dworkin alternates among three justifications for the moral reading.
First, he sometimes argues that the moral reading follows simply from the
language used by the Constitution. Terms like "due process" and "freedom of speech" are so much more abstract than, say, the requirement
that the President be at least thirty-five years old, that the former are most
1. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 119-45 (1985) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Principle].
2. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 14-45 (1978) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Rights].
3. See id. at 90-94, 101-30.
4. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's

Empire].
5. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion,
Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (1993) [hereinafter, Dworkin, Life's Dominion].
6. But cf. Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States passim

(1913) (showing that, as a historical matter, much of Constitution reflects political
compromises at Founding).
7. I use the phrase "the moral reading" to refer to Dworkin's general approach, rather
than a particular use of that approach.
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sensibly read to reflect the intentions of their authors to set down moral
principles, even if the latter is not. 8 Second, Dworkin sometimes argues
that judges and lawyers in the American constitutional tradition have
long understood their task to be one of elaborating moral principles,
even if they have not always recognized this explicitly.9 Thus, to practice
constitutional law competently within the American tradition, according
to Dworkin, is to practice the moral reading. Third, Dworkin sometimes
contends that the best conception of democracy requires that government treat all persons with equal respect (pp. 17-19)-a principle that,
according to Dworkin, entails the moral reading.
There is, of course, no necessary. inconsistency in Dworkin's multiple
justifications for the moral reading. It may well be that the framers of the
Constitution shared Dworkin's conception of democracy; that they
sought to embody that conception in abstract constitutional language;
and that lawyers and judges in the ensuing years have been faithful to
their choice of moral principles. If so, then Dworkin's various justifications reinforce one another.
Nonetheless, Freedom's Law does not explain how the justifications
for the moral reading interact. Suppose that the Constitution had used
less sweeping language, or that it were amended to remove one or more
of the moral principles Dworkin believes essential to the best conception
of democracy. Would Dworkin still insist upon finding that principle in
the Constitution, or would he, however reluctantly, acknowledge the primacy of the text, and if so, why? Freedom's Law addresses this kind of
question only indirectly.' 0 To appreciate fully Dworkin's jurisprudential
8. See p. 8 (distinguishing equal protection from minimum-age requirement for

President and from Third Amendment's prohibition on quartering of soldiers in private
homes during peacetime). As I explain in Part I, Freedom's Law generally uses the term

"moral reading" synonymously with "principled reading"-a term that invokes Dworkin's

general approach to jurisprudence. See infra Part I. Nevertheless, the Introduction to

Freedom's Law asserts that "the moral reading is not appropriate to everything a constitution
contains" (p. 8). This claim suggests that Dworkin here means to distinguish between
readings that treat constitutional clauses as principles and those that treat such clauses as

moral principles. I reject this interpretation because Dworkin's earlier work makes clear
that he believes that principles in law are principles of political morality. See Dworkin,

Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 96, 239. Thus, I argue in Part IV that despite Dworkin's
claim to the contrary, his jurisprudential commitments ought to lead him to apply a moral

reading to the entire Constitution. See infra Part IV.
9. See pp. 3-4 (stating that "[1]awyers and judges, in their day-to-day work,

instinctively treat the Constitution as expressing abstract moral requirements"); p. 265
(describing Robert Bork's judicial philosophy as rejection of constitutional tradition of
moral reading).

10. Bruce Ackerman puts the question starkly, hypothesizing a partial repeal of the
First Amendment, and the adoption of a new amendment stating, "Christianity is

established as the state religion of the American people, and the public worship of other
gods is hereby forbidden." Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 14 (1991).

Ackerman states that any contention that the new amendment is itself unconstitutional
ought to be summarily rejected, see id., although he asserts that rights-foundationalists, a
group in which Ackerman places Dworkin, see id. at 11, would conclude otherwise, see id.
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argument in Freedom's Law, one needs to understand it as part of his
larger jurisprudential project. Toward that end, in this Essay I juxtapose
the jurisprudence of Freedom's Law with a critique of Dworkin's overall
jurisprudence put forward by Dennis Patterson in his sweeping new book,
Law and Truth.
The essay proceeds in four parts. Part I addresses the theory of interpretation underlying the essays in Freedom's Law. Much of that theory is
negative; Dworkin devotes a substantial portion of his energy to setting
forth reasons for rejecting the claims of originalists as ultimately unworkable or incoherent. Freedom's Law does not, however, offer much in the
way of an affirmative case for morality as the guiding spirit of constitutional interpretation. Dworkin's defense of his favored interpretive
method appears in his earlier works, especially Law's Empire." Evaluating
the principal claims of Freedom's Law therefore requires some familiarity
with Dworkin's broader project. Not surprisingly, Part I concludes that
the constitutional argument in Freedom's Law is strengthened if one accepts Dworkin's general jurisprudential commitments.
One of the seemingly central features of Dworkin's jurisprudence is
the claim that there are right answers in law, even in hard cases (p.
341).12 Part II considers a particularly powerful critique of this claimDennis Patterson's postmodemism. In Law and Truth, Patterson describes how variousjurisprudents answer the question of what it means to
say that a proposition of law is true (Patterson, p. 3). When lawyers and
judges argue about what the law is, what, exactly, are they arguing about?
Patterson claims that most jurisprudential approaches attempt to answer
this question by specifying the external criteria that make statements of
law true or false. For example, a Hartian positivist would say that a statement of law is true if it emanates from an institution or person that rules
of recognition deem authoritative. 13 By contrast, Dworkin would say that
a proposition of law is true if it constitutes the best interpretation of the
law as a whole.
Despite the important differences among positivism, Dworkin'sjurisprudence, and the other approaches Patterson discusses, Patterson argues that most of them share an essential flaw: they mistakenly assume
that the truth-values of legal statements are given by conditions external
at 14-15. This does not appear to be an accurate characterization of Dworkin's view.
Dworkin rejects the absolute natural law position, under which a judge may set aside
enactments that violate natural law, even if they clearly satisfy the Constitution (p. 316).
But Dworkin does not state whether his opposition to absolute natural law rests ultimately
on a version of positivism, or whether he rejects absolute natural law because it departs too
far from the practice of American constitutionalism. See p. 316 (stating that "no scholar
claims that part of what the Constitution plainly says is not binding on judges because it is
too immoral to be law"). For a more detailed discussion of these themes, see infra Part
IVan.
11. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4 passim.
12. See Dworkin, Principle, supra note 1, at 119-45.
13. See H.LA Hart, The Concept of Law 89-107 (1961).

19971

TRUTH,JUSTICE, AND THE CONSTITUTION

to the practice of legal argument. Relying on the work of Richard
Rorty,' 4 Hilary Putnam,' 5 and the later Wittgenstein,' 6 Patterson outlines
a postmodem jurisprudence that has little use for questions about the
ultimate truth or falsity of legal propositions. Truth in law, Patterson
claims, is simply a matter of how the forms of legal argument are used.
After setting forth Patterson's general approach, Part II describes
Patterson's analysis of Dworkin. I argue that even if one accepts
Patterson's critique of Dworkin's view that there are right answers in hard
cases, Dworkin's interpretive method survives. In explaining his own
postmodern approach, Patterson contends that "[iun law, we choose the
proposition that best hangs together with everything else we take to be
true" (Patterson, p. 172). But this is precisely Dworkin's principle of law
as integrity, which requires judges to make the law cohere in the light of
language, precedent, practice and morality (pp. 10-11). Although
Patterson disagrees with Dworkin on what it ultimately means to say that a
proposition of law is true, the metaphysical disagreement has no practical
consequences.17

The true test of Dworkin's moral reading will be its application. Accordingly, in Part III, I summarize and evaluate the primary claims
Dworkin makes regarding the substantive controversies that give rise to
the essays collected in Freedom's Law. I focus on two issues that figure
prominently in Freedom's Law: abortion and freedom of speech and the
press. Although I find Dworkin's defense of his view of the proper constitutional treatment of these issues lucid and insightful,1 8 I conclude that
Dworkin's views often rest on assumptions or intuitions that are less
widely shared than he acknowledges. Most opponents of the abortion
right or Dworkin's vision of free speech will likely remain opponents after
reading Freedom's Law. The moral principles involved in debates about
abortion and (to a somewhat lesser degree) free speech are hotly contested in part because they rest on different moral premises. Dworkin's
interpretive method-which gives moral principles an important rolewill naturally producedifferent results depending upon the moral principles employed. The fact that any moral reading will thus engender con14. See Richard Rorty, Philosophical Papers (1991); Richard Rorty, Consequences of
Pragmatism (1982).
15. See Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality (1988).
16. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
3d ed. 1958).
17. Patterson is not troubled by my claim that his disagreement with Dworkin has no
practical consequences. "Philosophy is not about practical consequences," he states.
Letter from Dennis Patterson, Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of
Law, to the Author (Oct. 11, 1996) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). "Philosophy is
about the felicitous characterization of activities and practices." Id. If Patterson wishes to
view his own work in this way, that is his prerogative, of course. From the perspective of
one who does not share Patterson's viewpoint, however, it seems a little odd that he
believes that truth is a matter of practice and that practical consequences don't matter.
18. In the interest of full disclosure, I should add that I generally agree with
Dworkin's bottom line on these issues.
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troversy does not, by itself, count as an indictment of Dworkin's method.
Nevertheless, views about concrete cases have a way of influencing one's
views about methodology.
In Part IV, I contend that Dworkin's case for the moral reading is
partially weakened by his choice to focus on such hotly contested issues of
political morality. Part IV begins by returning to the ambiguity in
Freedom's Law I identified above: the question why we should view the
Constitution as embodying moral principles. I suggest that Dworkin's
normative argument for the moral reading is a specific instance of his
general argument for law as integrity. I argue that, if this is so, then the
moral reading ought to apply to the entire Constitution, and not merely
to constitutional provisions that protect individual rights. Thus, Part IV
sketches the implications of the moral reading for issues not addressed by
Freedom'sLaw. I argue that the moral reading may have a significant role
to play in those structural areas of constitutional law, such as federalism,
that do not directly involve individual rights. Although the stakes in such
cases can be extremely high, they do not typically call forth the sort of
passion that individual rights cases do. Hence, Dworkin's quest for principled interpretation may be more successful (because less divisive) in
such cases. I conclude, however, by noting that application of the moral
reading to issues such as federalism raises additional serious questions
about the general justifications for the moral reading.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE

OF FEDOM'

LA W

The moral reading posits that the abstract clauses of the Constitution
embody moral principles. How does ajudge decide the content of these
principles? Is this enterprise one of pure political morality by the judge?
Freedom'sLaw answers these questions by relying on Dworkin's views about
law in general. Possible readings must be constrained by a variety of factors, including text, precedent, and practice. In other words, the requirement of integrity operates as a significant restraint on the way constitutional principles may be formulated. Morality is crucial to Dworkin's
reading of the Constitution, but it is morality within the framework of law
as integrity. Dworkin's case for the moral reading thus depends on his
case for law as integrity. In this Part, I locate Freedom's Law within
Dworkin's broader jurisprudential philosophy of law as integrity.
The chapters of Freedom's Law that discuss the failed Supreme Court
nomination ofJudge Robert Bork 19 present Dworkin's moral reading by
contrasting it with originalism. Dworkin contends that Bork offers no
principled argument for the level of abstraction at which Bork chooses to
view the intentions of the Framers. The abstraction question forms the
centerpiece of Dworkin's critique of Bork, but it is also essential to
Dworkin's affirmative views.
19. These are Chapters 12, 13, and 14.
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Dworkin offers Brown v. Board of Education20 as the starting point for
his critique of originalism. Because of the central place Brown occupies
in modem constitutional law, Dworkin contends that "[n] o theory seems
acceptable that condemns that decision as a mistake" (p. 268). Yet the
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend it to outlaw
segregated education. 2 1 How does Bork reconcile Brown with
originalism?
As Dworkin notes, in justifying Brown, Bork looks to the intentions of
the Framers at a fairly abstract level. Bork contends that judges should
not consult the concrete expectations and opinions of the framers about
what would or would not constitute a denial of equal protection. Instead,
judges should identify the principle the Framers enacted and then decide

for themselves whether the challenged practice is consistent with the
22

principle.
Dworkin approves of this approach (pp. 269, 299), but goes on to
criticize Bork for failing to provide a principled method for deciding how
abstractly to characterize the principle chosen by the Framers. Did the

Framers mean to adopt the principle of color-blindness, as Bork argues,
or the principle that government may not discriminate on the basis of
prejudice, as Dworkin contends (pp. 270, 299-300)? Dworkin concludes
that we must "assign to the framers a principle that is sufficiently general

not to seem arbitrary and ad hoc" (p. 271). Doing so will, according to
Dworkin, mean endorsing the results in many cases that Bork deems ille-

gitimate (p. 271).
Dworkin's treatment of the abstraction question is critical to his own

affirmative approach to interpretation. He rejects narrow originalism as
inconsistent with the actual practice of constitutional law. In principle,
he approves the broader originalism endorsed by Bork to salvage Brown,
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Dworkin cites Raoul Berger, Government byjudiciary: The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment 118-19 (1977) for this proposition (pp. 268, 381 n.3). Berger's
historical claims have been challenged, most recently by Michael McConnell, who argues
that many in the Reconstruction Congress viewed segregation as incompatible with the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1049-117 (1995). But see Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 Yale L.J. 2309, 2337-43 (1995) (reviewing Owen M.
Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910 (1993)) (claiming that Fiss's
view that Fourteenth Amendment was identified with desegregation is unsupported by
evidence); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1883 (1995) (criticizing
McConnell's belief that Framers of Fourteenth Amendment were sympathetic to
integration). As I have noted elsewhere, the efforts to challenge the conventional wisdom
merely confirm the importance originalists place upon reconciling Brown with their
methodology. See Michael C. Doff, A Nonoriginalist Perspective on the Lessons of
History, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 351, 357 (1996).
22. See pp. 268, 298-99 (citing Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law 162-63 (1990)).
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but Dworkin takes this as a mere starting point.2 3 While Bork fails to

provide a method for selecting the appropriate level of generality,
Dworkin contends that he (Dworkin) succeeds.
Note, however, that the issue is not one of abstraction, per se. For
example, in the equal protection context, Bork's principle of color-blindness is both narrower and broader than Dworkin's principle condemning
discrimination based on prejudice. Bork's principle is narrower because,
unlike Dworkin's, it would not condemn discrimination on the basis of
sex or sexual orientation, while Dworkin's would. On the other hand,
Bork's principle would condemn affirmative action programs designed to
benefit racial minorities at the expense of non-minorities, whereas
Dworkin's would not (p. 300).24 Thus, Dworkin's critique of Bork poses
of a variety of abstract principles a conthe question how to decide which
25
stitutional provision embodies.
Dworkin states in the Introduction to Freedom's Law that he favors "a
particular way of stating the constitutional principles at the most general
possible level" (p. 7). The qualifier "possible" is crucial for several
reasons.
The most general level of a principle is essentially empty. Consider
Equal
Protection Clause. 26 Does it, for example, mean that the
the
State's failure to enact laws redistributing all property and mandating uniform income denies equal protection to the poor? If equal protection
requires strict equality of outcomes, apparently the answer is yes. On the
other hand, interpreting the concept as requiring equality of opportunity
would condemn many redistributive programs. If A works harder than B,
then it denies A's entitlement to be rewarded equally for her work when
the State redistributes her income to B. The abstract concept of equality
cannot by itself decide between the competing, somewhat less abstract
conceptions of equality. Thus, the most general possible level of a principle must immediately include the qualifier that the principle be sufficiently concrete to guide some actual decisions.
23. The maneuver exactly tracks Dworkin's approach to the speaker's meaning theory
of statutory interpretation. In Law's Empire, Dworkin hypothesizes a judge, Hermes, who
begins with the view that a judge should give statutes the effect their authors intended.
Dworkin shows that because of the inevitable ambiguities in this approach, Hermes will
eventually be led to search for principles that transcend the concrete intentions and
expectations of legislators. He will, in other words, be led to the method of Dworkin's
Hercules, law as integrity. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 317-33; see also
text accompanying notes 30-33 (discussing Hercules as judge implementing law as
integrity approach).
24. See also Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4,at 393-97.
25. See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, On Reading the Constitution
101-04 (1991) (arguing that there is no single metric or direction of abstraction).
26. See generally Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (1996) (describing different
conceptions of equality); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537,
547 (1982) (arguing that principle of treating like kinds similarly offers no guidance
absent moral conception of what characteristics are alike).
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Before considering additional qualifiers, I should address an objection to the argument I have just proposed. A critic might note that every
moral principle will be susceptible to multiple interpretations. For example, suppose we settle on a conception of equality that condemns discrimination based on prejudice against minority groups. We still will find substantial disagreement over what counts as such prejudice. Does a state
policy favoring intra-racial adoption constitute impermissible ratification
of the prejudice of private parties, 27 or does it constitute a laudable effort
to strengthen the child's ability to combat prejudice? The anti-discrimination principle itself cannot choose between these conceptions.
This criticism suggests that no abstract principle will be sufficiently
concrete to decide all cases. That is true, but largely beside the point.
Only a purely mechanical approach-such as "always sustain legislative
power"-would be self-applying. It is in the nature of a moral principle
that its application will often be controversial.2 8 My objection to the principle of "equality" as such is not that it could not guide all cases. The
objection is that it would guide hardly any cases. To have utility, a moral
principle must provide substantial guidance, but need not (and cannot)
be mechanical.
A moral principle must be sufficiently abstract so that it does not
appear ad hoc, yet sufficiently concrete to provide actual guidance.
These are important constraints, but they hardly decide among all competing principles. The choice between competing principles, Dworkin
maintains, must be made according to two criteria: integrity and political
29
morality.
In Law's Empire, Dworkin asks how Hercules, a judge with infinite
time to decide each dispute, resolves hard cases. Dworkin describes three
phases of adjudication. The first is pre-interpretive. Hercules locates the
thing to be interpreted. This stage typically involves no controversy. In a
constitutional case, there will be agreement that it is the text of the
Constitution that must be interpreted.
The second phase requires Hercules to apply criteria of fit. Hercules
assembles potential principles as candidates for use in deciding the case.
He eliminates from his list all of those candidates that are inconsistent
with so much of the accepted body of law as to fail to qualify as interpretations of that law. Dworkin analogizes the process to the creation of a
chain novel-a novel written by successive authors. Once n chapters
27. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984) (holding that court may not
take account of likely private prejudice to prefer same-race couple to interracial couple in
custody determination).
28. Note that i am not here relying on Dworkin's distinction between rules and
principles. See Dworkin, Rights, supra note 2, at 14. The application of a rule may be

controversial in the same way that the application of a principle may be.
29. Freedom' Law includes a short summary of what law as integrity is (p. 83), but not
Dworkin's broader argument for why our constitutional tradition should be viewed as an

instance of law as integrity. For the latter, see Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at
225-75.
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have been written, the n+lth chapter may take a variety of different
forms, but many candidates will be ruled out
as having too little to do
30
with the content of chapters one through n.
In the third phase, from among the candidate principles that meet
the minimum requirements of fit, Hercules must choose the principle
that puts the law as a whole in its best possible light. This task engages
moral judgment, but it also engages fit, because Hercules will sometimes
sacrifice his conception of ideal justice to conform his judgment to the
remaining body of law. This is because integrity itself serves a moral principle-that the law should be interpreted as if it emanated from a single
author, committed to laying down principled norms.3 1
Dworkin's argument for the single-authorship principle is complex
and subtle, but for my present purposes it boils down to two essentials.
First, because a community does not have mental states in the same way
that we imagine an individual does, discovering the intent of the drafters
of a statute or constitutional provision invariably necessitates constructing
intent. Dworkin argues that the best method for constructing a collective
intent involves constructing a coherent intent, that is, an intent that could
32
emanate from a single mind committed to stating consistent principles.
The second piece of Dworkin's argument for the single-author approach is more openly a proposition of political morality than a general
interpretive theory. Dworkin contends that in a constitutional democracy, the government must treat all persons with equal respect-and that
at a minimum, this requires that the distinctions the government draws
among persons must be supported by arguments of principle rather than
by mere favoritism. 33 In interpreting the law, therefore, judges should
not be free to treat various provisions as preferring the welfare of some
over others for unprincipled reasons. The single-authorship concept enables judges to think of the law as reflecting the views of a principled
community.
The equal respect principle and the single-author principle that
Dworkin derives from it are quite ambiguous. Although some public
choice theorists suggest that laws should be interpreted as reflecting the
spoils of a competition among mutually hostile interest groups,3 4 most
judges would accept Dworkin's prescription of principle. 5 They would
disagree, however, over what constitutes a principled decision in a given
30. See id. at 228-54.
31. See id. at 167-75, 186-224.
32. See, e.g., id. at 343 (discussing use of legislative history in constructing "acts of the
state personified").
33. See id. at 173-75.
34. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15-18 (1984).
35. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) ("[A] decision
without principled justification would be no judicial act at all."); cf. Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15-19 (1959) ("The
main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled.").
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case. Thus, the full meaning of Dworkin's theory can only be grasped by
examining its applications. Before doing so, however, it will be useful to
consider a critique of Dworkin's basic outlook.
II. THm POSTMODERN CGrrIQuE

OF THE

MoRAL

READING

Within the American constitutional tradition, the most obvious objection to Dworkin's moral reading would focus on institutional setting.
When the Constitution uses abstract language susceptible to a variety of
interpretations, why should judges prefer their own interpretations to
those given by representative bodies?3 6 The Introduction to Freedom's
Law outlines Dworkin's answer to what Alexander Bickel termed the
"countermajoritarian difficulty."3 7 Dworkin contends that the practice of
judicial review strengthens rather than undermines democracy, because
constitutional democracy utilizes majoritarian rule primarily as a means
of according citizens equal respect; legislation that denies persons equal
respect is thus inconsistent with constitutional democracy (pp. 15-35).
It may be useful to think of Dworkin's approach to the practice of
judicial review as belonging to the same family as John Hart Ely's approach. Whereas Ely would largely confine judicial review to correcting
breakdowns in the political process,3 8 however, Dworkin believes that judicial review also ought to be available for policing the substantive boundaries of governmental authority (pp. 21-26). Dworkin ventures that such
substantive review both ensures that government does not interfere with
areas of life that government has no legitimate authority to control, and
has the added benefit of removing such contentious issues as abortion
and the right to die from the realm of ordinary politics-where they tend
to swamp the legislative agenda.3 9
Ultimately, however, the institutional criticism is not crucial, because
Freedom's Law does not address the legitimacy of judicial review as such.
36. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Earl Warren Is Dead, The New Republic, May 13, 1996, at
35 (contending that Dworkin does not adequately defend his interpretive method against
charge that it gives too much power to unelectedjudges).
37. Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics 16 (1962).
38. SeeJohn Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: a Theory ofJudicial Review (1980).
Dworkin would probably disapprove of the comparison. See Dworkin, Principle, supra
note 1, at 57-69 (critiquing Ely's approach to judicial review).
39. James Fleming criticizes Dworkin's claim that substantive rights such as abortion
are among the pre-conditions of democracy in the same way as procedural rights such as
voting are. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L.
Rev. (forthcoming Mar. 1997); see also James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative
Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1995) (arguing that, following Dworkin's general
approach, the best interpretation of the Constitution as a whole includes protection for
both substantive rights and procedural rights); Frank I. Michelman, Democracy and
Positive Liberty: Intimations From New Constitutional Theory, B. Rev., Oct.-Nov. 1996, at

3, 4 (constrasting Dworkin's substantive approach with Jfirgen Habermas' procedural
approach). Fleming's critique is limited to Dworkin's method, rather than the substance
of his argument.
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The book is about how to read the Constitution, rather than who should
4° Even if the Constitution
read it.
were entirely non-justiciable, elected
officials would still have an obligation to comply with and therefore interpret it. Dworkin proposes that his method should apply to all constitutional interpreters. A satisfactory criticism of the moral reading would
thus have to critique the moral reading as practiced by legislators no less
than judges.
In this Part, I consider a critique of Dworkin's approach that focuses
on the substance of his program rather than the institutional setting.
The challenge comes from an assortment of philosophical positions that
may be usefully grouped under the heading "postmodernism." Although
self-styled postmodernists disagree about precisely what postmodernism
is, for present purposes it will be sufficient to explore one account of
postmodemism-that presented in Dennis Patterson's new book, Law
and Truth. As I argue below, however, how one goes about reading legal
texts does not in any significant way depend upon whether one accepts
Dworkin's (or Patterson's) views about ultimate truth.
As Patterson acknowledges, Law and Truth is largely "a work of demolition" (Patterson, p. 181). Its principal targets include most of the leading approaches to jurisprudence-the formalism of Ernest Weinrib
(Patterson, pp. 22-42), the moral realism of Michael Moore (Patterson,
pp. 43-58), the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart (Patterson, pp. 59-70),
Dworkin's account of law as integrity (Patterson, 71-98), and Stanley
Fish's account of law as the product of interpretive communities
(Patterson, pp. 99-127).
Patterson's critique draws heavily from philosophy of language. It is
one of the great virtues of Law and Truth that Patterson's lucid prose
manages to use this often highly technical body of writing to illuminate
the jurisprudential debate rather than obfuscate it. Patterson has independently valuable insights about each of the approaches he critiques,
but his primary goal is to show how all of these approaches-including
Dworkin's-share a common flaw. Patterson argues that most accounts
ofjurisprudence rest on a false notion of what makes a proposition of law
true (Patterson, p. 151). I conclude, however, that Dworkin's account of
law can be rendered consistent with Patterson's postmodern
jurisprudence.
A. Realism, Anti-Realism, and Postmodernism
Law and Truth begins and ends with a discussion of the relation between the realist/anti-realist debate in jurisprudence and that debate in
philosophy. Realists believe that knowing the meaning of a proposition
consists in knowing what facts in the world would make it true. For example, the statement "Dinosaurs became extinct because of climatic changes
40. Dworkin contends that the moral reading is consistent with a variety of
institutional arrangements allocating final constitutional authority (pp. 33-34).
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caused by a meteor striking the Earth," is true if and only if events in the
distant past correspond with what the statement asserts. 4 1 We may not
know whether the statement is true, but that does not alter the fact that it
is (or is not) true.
Anti-realists deny the possibility that "the truth conditions for a proposition may lie beyond our capacities to recognize them" (Patterson, p.
5). As one anti-realist explains, "'anti-realism rests on the proposition
that speakers grasp the meaning of, or understand, a sentence when they
know which conditions warrant its assertion.' "42 Knowing the meaning
of a statement here means knowing the conventions that must be satisfied
to verify its truth. If the anti-realist lacks epistemic access to the cause of
the dinosaurs' extinction, she will deny that the above statement is a
meaningful one.
Similarly, moral philosophers may be divided into realist and antirealist camps. A moral realist believes that moral propositions are true,
even though we lack the tools to prove their truth. Moral anti-realists
deny this, and accordingly interpret moral statements such as "slavery is
wrong" as expressing preferences or emotions of the speaker. Thus, according to the moral anti-realist, the speaker means to say that he dislikes
slavery or slavery makes him feel bad (Patterson, p. 6).
Despite their differences, Patterson argues that realism and anti-realism are united in an important respect: both accept that knowing the
meaning of a statement consists in knowing the conditions that make the
statement true. For the realist, these conditions are facts in the world
that may or may not be beyond our epistemic access. For the anti-realist,
the truth conditions consist of conventional criteria of verification
(Patterson, pp. 6, 167).
Patterson proffers postmodernism as an alternative account of meaning that does not depend on conditions. The difficulty with realism,
Patterson argues, is its inability to explain how our language corresponds
with reality-the absence of a medium through which word and world
interact. The difficulty with anti-realism is its apparent denial of the possibility of having knowledge about the external world apart from our conventions. Patterson argues that postmodernism overcomes both of these
difficulties. Postmodernism acknowledges interaction with the external
world, but denies that the external world or our experience of it produces
truth (Patterson, p. 167). Postmodernism shifts the focus from the truth
of propositions about the world to the description of activities in the
world (Patterson, pp. 167-69).
Of course, postmodernists still use the word "truth," but rather differently from the way that realists or anti-realists use it. Patterson illus41. See generally Hillary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (1981) (providing
sophisticated defense of philosophical realism that owes much to pragmatism).
42. Patterson, p. 5 (quotingJames 0. Young, Meaning and Metaphysical Realism, 63
Philosophy 114, 115 (1988)).
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trates the postmodern view of truth with a metaphor developed by W. V.
0. Quine.43 According to Quine, our beliefs about the world form a
complex web, so that when we say that an interaction with the world
causes us to change our view of the world, we mean that we adjust the
web. But the web is sufficiently complex that we will have some freedom
about where and how to adjust it. As Patterson puts it, we evaluate new
experiences by adjusting our web of belief in such a way that best" 'hangs
together' with everything else we take to be true" (Patterson, p. 159). For
the postmodernist, the criteria for determining what beliefs best hang
together provide the meaning of statements. I shall have more to say
about Patterson's postmodern conception of meaning, but first, let us see
what Patterson's general discussion of realism and anti-realism has to do
with jurisprudence.
B. PostmodemJurisprudence
Patterson's treatment of the jurisprudence of Dworkin and of Stanley
Fish closely parallels his general treatment of philosophical realists and
anti-realists. Patterson casts Dworkin in the role of moral realist 4 4 and
Fish in the role of anti-realist, but goes on to argue that Dworkin and Fish
are united in their mistaken belief that the truth of a proposition of law is
a matter of conditions external to legal practice (Patterson, pp. 111-17).
The casting is initially plausible. In criticizing legal positivism,
Dworkin has characterized it as a form of anti-realism.

45

Moreover,

Dworkin's contention that there really are right answers in hard cases,
even if we lack the means to prove them, seems to be a realist proposition. Similarly, Patterson's chapter on Fish does a nice job connecting
Fish's claims that the meaning of a text is in the reader or, as Fish argues
in his more recent work, the conventions held by a community of readers, 46 with the anti-realist view that truth is a matter of convention
(Patterson, pp. 99-127). Fish disputes Patterson's characterization of his
work,47 but the precise question of whether Patterson accurately captures
Fish's ideas need not concern us here. Patterson's deeper point concerns
realist and anti-realist jurisprudence in general.
What is the postmodern alternative to the realist/anti-realist debate
in jurisprudence? We can best appreciate Patterson's postmodern approach to jurisprudence by examining his treatment of a legal scholar
43. Patterson, pp. 158-59 (citing Willard Van Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of
Empiricism, in From a Logical Point of View 20, 42-43 (Harper & Row 1961) (1953)).
44. In this context the term realism should not be confused with Legal Realism. To
the extent that Legal Realism treats law as a matter of convention, it is a form of
jurisprudential anti-realism.
45. See R.M. Dworkin, Introduction to The Philosophy of Law 1, 8-9 (R.M. Dworkin
ed., 1977).
46. See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class?: The Authority of Interpretive
Communities 322 (1980).
47. See Stanley Fish, How Come You Do Me Like You Do?: A Response to Dennis
Patterson, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 57, 57-65 (1993).
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who, according to Patterson, does not erroneously assume that the truth
of a proposition of law is given by conditions. For the most part,
Patterson approves of the "modal" approach to constitutional interpretation put forward by Philip Bobbitt (Patterson, pp. 128-50).
Bobbitt develops a typology of forms of argument-what he calls
"modalities"-that figure in the practice of constitutional interpretation. 48 Bobbitt identifies textual, doctrinal, historical, ethical, and prudential forms of argument as distinct modalities. According to Bobbitt,
constitutional scholars' attempts to legitimate the practice of judicial review are misguided, because legitimacy does not derive from a source external to the practice of constitutional interpretation; any legal argument
aimed at legitimating constitutional interpretation will necessarily employ
one or more of the modalities, leading to the question of what legitimates
that form of argument. Bobbitt contends that there is no way out of the
cycle, except to stop searching for an external criterion of legitimacy for
constitutional interpretation. Bobbitt proposes that constitutional jurisprudence study the use of the modalities. 49
It is not difficult to see why Patterson finds Bobbitt's approach attractive. 50 We may think of the modalities as the grammar of constitutional
argument. Bobbitt does not identify the truth (or legitimacy) of statements of constitutional law with conditions external to the practice of
constitutional law. Thus, he avoids what Patterson would call the mistake
of realists and anti-realists alike.
Patterson disagrees with Bobbitt in one important respect, however:
the question of how to resolve intermodal conflict. In hard cases, various
arguments will often point in different directions. The Justices who decided Brown, for example, faced strong doctrinal and historical arguments for siding with the school board, but also faced strong textual, ethical, and prudential arguments for siding with the plaintiffs. How does a
court resolve such a conflict? According to Bobbitt, the modalities themselves cannot answer this question. When faced with intermodal conflict,
thejudge must choose the result that produces justice as measured by the
judge's own values. 51
Patterson believes that Bobbitt's resort to subjective judicial conscience does not adequately capture the degree to which adjudication is a
public exercise in persuasion. He states: "For recursion to conscience to
succeed as a solution to the problem of modal conflict, it must be possible to wed to the exercise of individual conscience an account of constitu48. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 11-22 (1991); Philip Bobbitt,

Constitutional Fate 6-8 (1982).
49. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 48, at 122-40, 155-56.

50. Both Bobbitt and Patterson rely heavily on the later work of Wittgenstein. See
George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End ofJurisprudence, 29 Loy. LA

L. Rev. 545, 545 n.1 (1996).
51. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 48, at 178-86.
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tional argument that relies so heavily on a public, intersubjective practice
of legal argument" (Patterson, pp. 143-44).
Patterson believes that the practice of argument within the
postmodem web of knowledge, rather than individual conscience, resolves intermodal conflict. A lawyer in arguing a case, or a judge in writing an opinion, aims to show that the result she favors best hangs together with everything else taken to be true about the law (Patterson, p.
172). If the opposing counsel or the dissenting judges offer a strict textual argument, Patterson would counter with arguments designed to
show that strict textualism is generally unworkable or undesirable. 52 The
postmodern judge or lawyer convinces "'someone of something by appealing to beliefs he already holds and by combining these to induce
further beliefs in him, step by step, until the belief we wanted finally to
inculcate in him is inculcated.'
Although this account effectively describes the making of an argument, it does not describe how the listener evaluates the argument. How,
according to the postmodern account, does ajudge decide which of several competing interpretations fits best with everything else taken to be
true? Patterson gives a number of examples in which the preferred interpretation is the one that he says best coheres with legal practices generally (Patterson, pp. 174, 176-79). In each case, however, Patterson simply
assumes that the reader will share his conclusions about which interpretation leads to the most coherent view. To be sure, if someone disagrees,
he has a strategy for trying to convince her, but if at the end of the day
she continues to disagree, she simply will hold a different view about the
most coherent interpretation.
In practice, Patterson's approach to interpretation does not differ
significantly from Dworkin's. Postmodernism appears to endorse law as
integrity: the interpretation that best hangs together with everything else
we take to be true about the law is precisely the interpretation that
Hercules5 4 would favor. But how can this be, given Dworkin's supposedly
false view that truth in law is a matter of conditions? To answer this question requires that we consider Patterson's specific objections to Dworkin's
jurisprudence.
",53

C. Postmodernism and Integrity
Patterson's critique of Dworkin amounts to one central claim-that
Dworkin overstates the role of interpretation in law, and in understanding generally, because interpretation is a second-order activity. 55 I argue
in this section that Patterson's ultimate philosophical disagreement with
52. See Patterson, pp. 172-74 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)).
53. Patterson, p. 172 (quoting W.V. Quine & J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief 86
(1970)).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
55. Patterson, p. 86. Patterson adds two additional grounds for criticism: that the
need for interpretation is not ever-present in law, and that Dworkin's account of law is
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Dworkin has few, if any, practical consequences. Dworkin's concept of
law as integrity is the practical equivalent of the postmodem web.
Patterson illustrates his basic criticism with the following example.
One diner says to another, "pass the salt" (Patterson, p. 87). In Dworkin's
view, the second diner must interpret the request-that is, she must lay
her interpretive template over the words to produce meaning. Patterson
protests that there is no need for interpretation here because the request
is clear. He states: "Understanding is acting properly in response to the
request. If the request is vague or otherwise opaque, interpretation of
the request may be necessary, otherwise not" (Patterson, p. 87). As
Patterson puts it, "[i]nterpretation is an activity of clarification"
(Patterson, p. 87). Whereas Dworkin would treat all instances of linguistic understanding as interpretation, Patterson reserves the term interpretation for hard cases. Is this a purely semantic debate about the word
"interpretation" or does it have jurisprudential consequences?
Dworkin's and Patterson's respective approaches to easy cases make
clear that there is a metaphysical difference. In Law's Empire, Dworkin
argues that Hercules does not need one approach for hard cases and a
different approach for easy cases; he applies the same method in all cases,
but in easy cases only one answer will be consistent with integrity.5 6
Patterson finds this view implausible. He prefers the conventionalist account, under which "easy cases are easy because there exist established
institutional criteria for what counts as a justification for a claim that a
given proposition of law is true" (Patterson, p. 90).
Who has the better of the argument? Initially, Patterson's account
appears more plausible. It is at least a bit odd to suppose that interpretive
theory is at work in easy cases, hidden from view even from the judges
deciding the case.
Patterson's critique apparently assumes that law as integrity provides
a causal account of easy cases. However, Dworkin happily concedes that
57
judges do not in fact engage in an interpretive struggle in easy cases.
Nor does Dworkin deny the existence of the conventionalist's "established institutional criteria" in easy cases. He would say that these are the
criteria of fit. The fact that they are firmly established is what it means to
say the case is easy: fit determines the outcome, and there is no opportunity for the judge to assess competing interpretations that satisfy the criteria of fit.58 Dworkin's theory does not founder on easy cases. It is sensidescriptively inaccurate (Patterson, p. 86). I treat these as specific applications of
Patterson's claim that interpretation is a second-order activity.
56. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 265-66, 353-54.
57. See id. at 266 ("Hercules would be happy to concede[ ] that we need not ask
questions when we already know the answer.").

58. Consider an analogy. The equations of Einstein's theory of special relativity
reduce to Newton's laws of motion for objects travelling at speeds significantly slower than
the speed of light. But the fact that Newton's laws are fully adequate to calculate when two
trains will meet does not prove that special relativity is not really at work. Similarly, the fact

that conventionalism can account for easy cases does not show that law as integrity fails.
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ble to speak of interpretation even in easy cases-whether they involve
the speed limit in California5 9 or a request to pass the salt.
Ultimately, Patterson's critique of Dworkin rests on the same claim as
his critique of Bobbitt: that Dworkin's account makes law a personal,
rather than an inter-subjective enterprise. 60 Hercules decides for himself
what interpretation puts the law in its best light. Patterson's reading of
Dworkin is understandable. As an initial matter, Dworkin does not pay
much attention to the problems of arriving at consensus on a multi-judge
court;6 1 thus, he suggests that a judge with his view of interpretation focuses inward. Moreover, Dworkin characterizes the attitude of integrity
as "protestant,"62 by which he means that each reader must ultimately
decide the text's meaning himself, rather than relying on an authoritative
interpretation. 63 For Dworkin, political obligation means obligation "to a
scheme of principle each citizen has a responsibility to identify, ultimately
for himself, as his community's scheme."64 Dworkin's language thereby
suggests that law as integrity pays insufficient regard to the intersubjectivity of the law, as Patterson claims (Patterson, p. 98).65
Nevertheless, Patterson's reading of Dworkin is strained. Patterson
sums up what he believes to be wrong with Dworkin's account of interpretation as follows: "The very idea of interpretation as a normative activity
demands that the process of interpretation be a practice and not a private
conversation with oneself" (Patterson, p. 97). Despite his talk of protestantism, Dworkin need not (and in my view, does not) deny this. The
requirement of fit ensures that the interpretation the judge adopts is one
that is largely shaped by the legal community. That is, after all, what it
means to say that an interpretation fits the law.
What then of hard cases? In hard cases, Dworkin says the judge must
choose from among competing interpretations, each of which could be
said to fit the law. At this point, does Dworkin's account require the
judge to retreat into himself? In one sense, of course it does. If two competent judges acting in good faith would at this point give different anJust as slow-moving objects are a special case of Einstein's theory, so easy cases are special
cases of Dworkin's. And it makes no difference that most of our experience involves slowmoving objects or easy cases.
59. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 266.
60. Patterson's position appears to derive from Wittgenstein's critque of private
language. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 68-77 (G. E. M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958).
61. However, when Dworkin does pay attention to the interpersonal dynamics of the
Supreme Court, he has interesting insights. See p. 66 (examining positions of individual
Justices in plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)).
62. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 190, 413.
63. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 30-37 (1988) (distinguishing between
Protestant and Catholic styles of constitutional interpretation).
64. Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 190.
65. Patterson levels the same criticism at Fish (Patterson, pp. 125-26).
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swers, surely this is because they are different judges. Each judge applies
the law as he understands it.
But what alternative is there? If the judge does not apply the law as
he sees it, he must apply someone else's view of the law. For a Supreme
Court Justice deciding a constitutional question, this means applying
what he believes6 6to be the wrong view of the law. This is hardly an attractive alternative.
In hard cases, Hartian positivists hold that the law is indeterminate,
so that a judge has discretion. 67 Bobbitt contends that in such cases the
conscience of the judge mediates the conflict among forms of argument. 68 Patterson dislikes both views because a private mechanism is at

work. He believes that hard cases call for argument about what view of
the law fits best with everything "we take to be true" (Patterson, p. 172).
But who is the "we" here? Different judges may believe that different
interpretations better fit everything else each takes to be true about the
law. Law as integrity at this point asks each judge to articulate a principled argument for why she prefers the interpretation she does. This public articulation may lead another judge to change his mind, but inevitably
there will be cases in which it will not.
Dworkin's approach therefore escapes Patterson's objections about
intersubjectivity. Moreover, it also survives Patterson's linguistic objection. Even if we assume that Patterson is correct-that truth is not a matter of conditions-no practical consequences follow. Dworkin believes
that finding the interpretation that best hangs together with everything
we take to be true about the law means finding a truth that really is out
there. Patterson protests that this is so much metaphysical nonsense. He
says that once we have found the interpretation that best hangs together
with everything else, we have found all we can find, and we should not
fool ourselves that we have found something that corresponds to a
deeper reality. This is an interesting philosophical disagreement, but it
has no clear practical bite. In practice, Patterson demands of interpretation exactly the same thing that Dworkin demands: integrity.
In an important sense, Patterson's project succeeds. Patterson states
that he has no "intention to advance yet another 'theory of law,' for it is
just such an enterprise [he] wish [es] to call into question" (Patterson, p.
181). The methodological similarities between postmodernism and
Dworkin's law as integrity illustrate the irrelevance of a theory of law to
the resolution of legal questions-even quite abstract legal questions
such as "How does a judge discern the law?" Patterson's explication of
66. There are situations in which the law instructs judges to defer to the views of other
judges or institutions. See Michael C. Dorf,Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L.
Rev. 651, 690-95 (1995) (discussing cases in which a single justice of Supreme Court acts
as surrogate for full Court). But in these cases, thejudge understands that the law he takes
to be correct commands him to defer to someone else's view.
67. See Hart, supra note 18, at 200.
68. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 48, at 178-86.
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postmodernism sheds light on Dworkin's theory because Patterson clarifies the terms in which Dworkin must defend his own claims. The test of
the moral reading would appear to be how it actually functions: does the
practice of constitutional law provide the means for showing how a moral
reading best hangs together with everything else we take to be true? This
sort of question can only be answered by looking at how the moral reading is used-a question I address in the next Part.
III. THE MoRAL

READING IN PRACTME

To present a flavor of how Dworkin himself would practice the moral
reading, in this Part I discuss his treatment of the substantive controversies that gave rise to the essays in the first two sections of Freedom's Law.
Rather than discuss each essay separately, I concentrate here on the two
issues that dominate the book: abortion 69 and free speech.
A. Abortion
Dworkin's defense of the proposition that the Constitution forbids
government from proscribing abortion prior to the late stages of pregnancy consists of two main contentions. He first explains why many arguments frequently invoked to defeat the abortion right would, if taken seriously, undermine the Supreme Court's role as guarantor of virtually all
individual rights. He then goes on to offer an affirmative argument for
why the Constitution should be interpreted to recognize an abortion
right. Dworkin succeeds splendidly in the first task, but in my view, is less
successful in the second.
One objection to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade"° is that the
Constitution nowhere mentions abortion or other unenumerated rights
that the Court has recognized via the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
69. Section I of Freedom'sLaw is titled "Life, Death, and Race." It contains four essays
on abortion as well as an essay on the right to die, and a book review of former Solicitor
General (now Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice) Charles Fried's memoirs.
The abortion essays were published separately from 1989 to 1992 and, as with all of the
essays in Freedom's Law, they have not been substantively revised (p. 35). This results in
some repetitiveness. Indeed, one paragraph is repeated verbatim in Chapters 1 and 3,
compare p. 48 with p. 87, and Dworkin repeats the general thrust of his argument several
times. On the other hand, the preservationist approach has the benefit of revealing
Dworkin to be an astute Court-watcher. For example, Chapter 2, which was published
shortly after the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), argues that despite the widespread view among liberals that
the case presaged the overruling of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) the opinion hints at
the possibility of retaining substantial protection for a constitutional right to abortion (pp.
66-68). Thatjudgment proved prescient, as Dworkin's discussion of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), in Chapter 4 illustrates (p. 29). Similarly, Chapter 13, which
was published in 1987, predicts that then-Judge Anthony M. Kennedy would be more
committed to the constitutional principles of integrity and individual rights than Judge
Bork would have been (pp. 284-86), a prediction vindicated by Casey as well as other
decisions. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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and Fourteenth Amendments. Dworkin responds that such arguments
prove too much (pp. 76-81). After all, the Constitution nowhere mentions flag-burning or sex discrimination in so many words. When the
Supreme Court has ruled that prohibitions on communicative flagburning and state-sponsored sex discrimination violate the Constitution,
it has relied, respectively, on the First Amendment's protection of "freedom of speech" and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws." 7' There may be reasons why one would disagree
with the holdings of such cases. In the case of sex discrimination, one
might attribute significance to the fact that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to prohibit sex discrimination, 72 or
one might think that biological differences between men and women
often justify different treatment, so that such treatment does not deny
equal protection. But it is hardly an argument against the unconstitutionality of sex discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause does not mention sex expressly. Neither does it mention race, although no one doubts
that the Equal Protection Clause limits the States' ability to discriminate
on the basis of race. Similarly, the First Amendment does not mention
flag-burning expressly, but it also does not mention leafletting or standing on a soapbox. It is impossible to specify all of the applications of a
norm along with the norm, and accordingly, no serious constitutional
scholar argues that the failure of a norm to mention a particular application inevitably means that the norm does not apply.
Thus, the fact that abortion is not "enumerated" as such in the Constitution does not distinguish it from any other putative right. Rather, the
relevant question is whether abortion ought to be viewed as a specific
application of the Constitution's prohibition of deprivations of "liberty"
"without due process of law."7 3
The best textual argument against Dworkin's position is the familiar
claim that the Due Process Clause only requires that when liberty is deprived, the deprivation must follow fair procedures-i.e., that due process means only what has come to be known as procedural due process,
and not (the somewhat oxymoronic) substantive due process. Dworkin
acknowledges that this is a plausible textual claim (pp. 72-73),74 but
71. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (sex discrimination); Texas v.Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag-burning).
72. As I have argued elsewhere, however, it is unclear why this counts as an argument
against treating sex discrimination as a violation of equal protection, rather than as an
argument for treating it as a violation. See Dorf, supra note 21, at 357-58 (arguing that
Framers' sexism demonstrates that women have suffered a history of discrimination).
73. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
74. This is not to say, however, that there are sound textual reasons for believing that
no provision of the Constitution provides substantive protection against state intrusions on
liberty. Were it not for the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the Supreme Court
might well have settled on the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that no state
interfere with the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV. As to the federal government, of course, the Ninth Amendment provides a
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points out that if one accepts it, then one must acknowledge that cases
such as Griswold v. Connecticut,75 protecting a right to use contraception,
as well as all of the Supreme Court's decisions protecting family decisionmaking, were wrongly decided (pp. 50-51).
Having addressed anti-Roe arguments that would jettison nearly all of
the Court's decisions protecting a zone of privacy, Dworkin turns to the
more precise question of whether abortion ought to be a protected right.
In his terms, Dworkin asks if the best moral reading prohibits state proscription of abortion.
Dworkin begins by acknowledging the moral difference between
abortion and contraception. Unlike most forms of contraception (or, for
that matter, consensual sexual acts by adults), abortion arguably involves
a harm to an innocent third party-the fetus. For Dworkin, the question
therefore comes down to whether the fetus is a person for constitutional
purposes. 76 His answer and the way he reaches it are somewhat complicated, but it is worth parsing the details, to illustrate the strengths and
weaknesses of the moral reading as Dworkin practices it.
Dworkin's argument rests on a distinction between what he calls "derivative" and "detached" reasons for protecting fetal life (p. 84).77 A derivative reason derives from various persons' own rights and interests.
Thus, if the fetus is a person, government has a derivative interest in protecting the fetus from harm, in exactly the same way that it has a derivative interest in protecting all persons from harm. By contrast, a detached
reason for action is independent of the rights or interests of specific individuals. When we say that human life has intrinsic worth, or that art exists
for art's sake, we identify detached reasons for protecting human life or
preserving works of art (p. 94). I argue below that the distinction between derivative and detached interests often collapses in practice, but in
theory Dworkin's meaning is plain enough. He means to distinguish between claims that a policy is good because it benefits people (derivative)
and claims that a policy is good in itself, apart from its effect on specific
people (detached).
plausible textual basis for the practice of recognizing substantive rights beyond those
guaranteed by the more concrete provisions of the Bill of Rights and Article I, section 9.
See id. amend. IX.
75. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76. Dworkin rejects the argument that abortion should be a protected right even if

the fetus is a person (pp. 48, 87). Although he acknowledges that the law generally does
not require people to come to the aid of others, he notes that parents are different, and

that while the burdens associated with a forced pregnancy are intense, so are those
imposed on parents (p. 48). Dworkin does not directly address the fact that abortion
prohibitions fail entirely on women, rather than on parents generally--and for that reason
could be seen as problematic on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst,

The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 58 (1977); Frances Olsen, The Supreme Court, 1988
Term-Comment: Unraveling Compromise, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 105, 117-26 (1989).
77. Close followers of Dworkin's work will recognize this distinction as central to his
book Life's Dominion. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 5.
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Dworkin draws on the derivative/detached distinction to advance
two central claims. First, he contends that a detached interest cannot be
a sufficient justification for overriding an individual right of high importance. Second, Dworkin argues that prior to the fetus's attaining some
form of consciousness, the government has a detached, but not a derivative interest in preserving it. Dworkin posits that fetuses attain rudimentary consciousness at roughly the time that they become viable, 78 and
therefore believes that Roe was right in its conclusion that prior to viability
the state lacks a sufficiently strong reason to prohibit abortion (pp.
90-95).79
What justifies Dworkin's first central claim? He believes that a detached interest cannot override a right because rights are often a zerosum commodity. For example, Dworkin contends that the states are not
free to declare that corporations are persons entitled to vote in state-wide
elections because to do so would devalue the right to vote of the natural
persons who are already constitutionally entitled to vote (pp. 88-89).80
Dworkin then argues that recognition of abortion as a constitutional right
similarly forbids the State from contracting the right's scope directly or
indirectly by, for example, declaring fetuses persons with competing
rights-assuming, as Dworkin also argues, and as the Supreme Court
agrees, that fetuses are not considered persons by the Constitution itself
(pp. 87-90).
Even if Dworkin's argument works in the voting case, the argument
is incorrect as a matter of general constitutional doctrine. The Supreme
Court has long recognized that fundamental rights may be restricted if
the restriction is necessary to further a compelling interest. Although the
Court has offered few criteria for determining what constitutes a compelling interest, it has never held that a compelling interest must be one that
rises to the level of constitutional right.8 ' Interests in economic stability,
public safety, and the environment are not matters of constitutional right;
78. Dworkin's claim that viability and consciousness closely coincide is, of course, an
empirical one. Although the crucial issue for Dworkin is consciousness, rather than
viability as such, because the existing doctrine uses viability as the relevant constitutional
criterion, I shall refer to viability. To the extent that Dworkin's empirical claim is false, his
argument applies to consciousness only, not viability.
79. Even before viability, however, the state's detached interest is sufficiently strong to
justify the state in taking measures falling short of prohibition to ensure that a pregnant
woman give due consideration to the intrinsic value of human life; these measures could
include insisting that a woman decide whether to carry the pregnancy to term within a
reasonable period of learning of the pregnancy. Thus, Dworkin also approves of the
portion of Roe that permits states to prohibit post-viability abortions where the
continuation of the pregnancy does not threaten the woman's life or health (pp. 55-56).
80. Justice Stevens relied in part on this argument in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 913 n.2 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Scholarship in the 1990s, 45 Hastings LJ.
1105, 1114-16 (1994) (reviewing Public Values in Constitutional Law (Stephen E. Gottlieb
ed., 1993)) (questioning logic and utility of linking compelling interests to constitutional

rights).
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yet, under appropriate circumstances, they could be invoked to defeat
claims of constitutional rights.
Dworkin could respond to this argument by noting that even if a
compelling interest is not itself a matter of constitutional right, it must
serve a derivative interest of constitutional persons. But even this more
limited claim appears to be false, as an example illustrates.
82
Suppose that, in violation of the Endangered Species Act,
Ishmael's religion requires him to hunt an endangered whale as part of
an annual ceremony. Under the Supreme Court's controversial 1990 ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, the application of the prohibition on
whale hunting would present no question of free exercise of religion because the law does not single out religious practice.8 3 However, a congressional statute enacted in response to Smith provides that the familiar
compelling interest test must apply to laws that, even though they are
generally applicable, impose a substantial burden on religion in a particular case. 84 I take it to be an open question under the statute whether the
protection of an endangered species is a sufficiently compelling interest
to justify burdening the right to free exercise of religion, but there is no
reason to suppose the interest would never justify such a burden.8 5 Thus,
even Congress, which has gone further than the Supreme Court in protecting free exercise of religion, might well have permitted the interest in
preserving an endangered species to trump the free exercise right.
Under Dworkin's approach, however, the protection of an endangered species is a detached interest, and is therefore automatically incapable of justifying the infringement of an individual right. For Dworkin,
the interest in the continuation of a species-as opposed to the preservation of particular animals that have interests in avoiding suffering and
death-is categorically disqualified from overcoming constitutional
rights, even though the opposite result can occur under existing law.
Dworkin could argue that the interest in an endangered species ultimately derives from the interests of constitutional persons. Species conservation not only preserves the wonder and diversity of life on the planet
for its own sake; such biodiversity also helps ensure a habitable planet for
humans and may lead to the discovery of useful products. Yet similarly
instrumental claims can be made for every interest that is initially justified
in non-instrumental terms. For example, art can be justified for art's
82. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
83. See 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990).

84. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1) (C) (iv), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(1994)). The Supreme Court will soon decide whether the Act is constitutional. See
Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3282 (1996);
see also Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1175, 1210-19 (1996).

85. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 580
(1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (terming prevention of cruelty to animals "not a
concern to be treated lightly").
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sake, but also for the edification it brings to those who view it. More to
the point, the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life could be justified on
the basis of the positive effects for already born human beings who might
benefit from the general respect for all human life that abortion regulations arguably produce. For Dworkin to maintain that derivative interests
alone justify infringing basic liberties, apparently he must define derivative interests so broadly as to include fetal life.
Furthermore, Dworkin's direct argument for the claim that the state
has only a detached interest in a pre-viable fetus is unlikely to convince
anyone that does not already hold that view. Dworkin effectively demonstrates that the fact that it would now be against an existing person's interest if his mother had decided to have an abortion rather than to bear
him does not imply that it would have been against anyone's interest at
the time she had the abortion. After all, it would have been equally
against the interest of the now-existing person if his mother had gone on
a long business trip instead of conceiving him (pp. 91-92). This is a negative point only, however. Dworkin's affirmative case relies on the claim
that "nothing has interests unless it has or has had some form of consciousness" (p. 91). This claim is central to Dworkin's argument, and yet
he offers no persuasive reason why someone who does not hold this view
would change her mind.
First, consider an example Dworkin does not address in Freedom's
Law. Does a dead person have interests? In the language quoted above,
Dworkin makes past or present consciousness a necessary condition of
interests, but not a sufficient condition. Thus it is not clear whether he
would say that a dead person has interests. If a dead person did have
interests, in what would they consist? We can envision two kinds of interests. The first rests on what Dworkin would term religious views, in the
broad sense-that is, views about the intrinsic value, meaning, and purpose of life (p. 108). Dworkin argues that although government may
urge people to care about such issues, it cannot dictate one answer for all
people (pp. 104-10). Thus, the overall thrust of Dworkin's argument
rules out a claim that a person's soul or spirit has interests that last beyond death.
Consider a second kind of interest of the dead. Laws concerning the
disposition of property following death apparently reflect the view that a
person's interest in the well-being of her loved ones and in the continuation of the goals she sought to advance during her life, survive her death.
But the logic of Dworkin's approach to the putative interests of the fetus
suggests that this way of thinking of things is confused. Honoring a dead
person's intentions means honoring the intentions of the person when she
was alive. At the time that we enforce a will, the person whose interests
are served has-from a completely secular standpoint-ceased to exist.
The fact that she once had interests does not mean that she now has
interests. On this view, laws concerning decedents' estates primarily serve
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to reassure the now-living that their intentions will be followed after their
death.
Thus Dworkin's argument about abortion appears to lead to the conclusion that the dead lack interests. If this is so, what category of beings
does Dworkin believe have interests by virtue of having "had" consciousness? Consider the case of an otherwise healthy person in a temporary
but complete state of unconsciousness, unable to experience pain or any
other sensation. Let us stipulate that her prognosis is good, so that we
expect her to regain consciousness soon, and to live a long, fulfilling life.
act
Does she have interests now? If someone were to kill her, would the
86
violate her interests or would it merely violate a detached interest?
I suspect that nearly everyone would answer that the killing violates
the unconscious patient's own interests and that Dworkin's reference to
beings that have "had" consciousness appears specifically designed to
cover this case. Notice an oddity, however. The fact that the unconscious
person will, if not killed, some day attain consciousness, does not distinguish her from a pre-viable fetus. Similarly, the fact that she has had
consciousness in the past does not distinguish her from a dead person.
Yet by Dworkin's reasoning neither pre-viable fetuses nor the dead have
interests. Why then does the unconscious person? In other words, other
than Dworkin's intuition, what justifies distinguishing the unconscious
patient from the other two cases?
Neither Freedom's Law nor Life's Dominion (in which Dworkin sets
forth a lengthier version of the same claim) 8 7 provides the kind of philosophical argument necessary to sustain the correlation between, on the
one hand, past and future consciousness, and on the other, interests.
Nonetheless, let us put these difficulties aside for now. Even if we cannot
articulate exactly why, many of us may share Dworkin's intuition that a
pre-conscious fetus lacks interests (and that a temporarily unconscious
person has interests). Still, we are left with the question of why the detached interest in the sanctity of all human life does not justify abortion
restrictions. Why, in other words, must the legality of abortion restrictions be judged without reference to views about the ultimate meaning
and purpose of life?
Indeed, we can envision a critique that casts Dworkin's argument for
the abortion right as running away from the central claim of Freedom's
Law, if not the central claim of Dworkin's career. For decades Dworkin
86. Perhaps the killing is motivated by a desire to serve derivative interests; the killer
wishes to harvest the unconscious person's organs for transplantation in other persons with
diseased organs. See Judith J. Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 Yale LJ. 1395, 1396
(1985) (describing hypothetical problem posed first in Philippa Foot, The Problem of
Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in
Moral Philosophy 19, 27-29 (1978)). See generally Frances Myrna Kamm, Mortality,
Morality (1993) (examining ethical and moral problems that arise in context of life and
death decisions).
87. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 5, at 213-17.
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has been arguing that the legal positivist distinction between law and morality ignores the reality that moral principles suffuse the law.8 8 Yet views
about the ultimate value, meaning, and purpose of life-the kinds of
views Dworkin apparently would banish from constitutional discourse
about fundamental rights 89 -in turn suffuse the moral reasoning likely to
be at stake in important questions of constitutional law. One can hardly
explain why a conscious being has an interest in avoiding pain, or in continuing to live, or in having her dreams fulfilled, without relying on views
about the ultimate value, meaning, and purpose of life. For this reason,
critics of John Rawls have argued that it is impossible to bracket one's
views about such ultimate issues and still debate questions of fundamental
value in a way that captures what is important to most people in the society under consideration. 90 This critique appears to be equally applicable
to Dworkin.
In the case of abortion, the moral reading Dworkin proposes rests on
two contested moral claims: that a non-viable fetus lacks interests of its
own; and that the state should not be permitted to pursue its detached
interest in the sanctity of life by prohibiting abortion. Dworkin does not
appear to have a strategy for convincing those readers who disagree with
either or both of these moral claims. Before addressing the consequences of this gap, however, it will be instructive to see how he applies
the moral reading to questions involving freedom of speech.
B. Free Speech
Throughout the essays concerning free speech, 9 1 Dworkin argues
that the relevant constitutional principle is best understood as one valuing free speech not merely as a means, but fundamentally as an end.
Dworkin contends that part of what it means for government to treat all
people with equal respect is for government to allow people the moral
88. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 1 ("There is inevitably a moral
dimension to an action at law."); Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 2, at 147
(arguing that constitutional interpretations calls for judges to "frame and answer questions

of political morality").
89. Note that Dworkin would not banish all consideration of detached interests from
constitutional law. He would allow the state to further an interest in the intrinsic sanctity
of life by measures falling short of coercion (p. 55). As Frances Kamm notes, however, if
Dworkin's objection to arguments based on the sacredness of life is that such arguments
are religious rather than secular, they should not play any legitimate role in constitutional
decisionmaking. See Frances M. Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of
Life's Dominion, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 160, 175 (1995) (book review).
90. See Kamm, supra note 89, at 174; see also MichaelJ. Sandel, Political Liberalism,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1767 (1994) (reviewingJohn Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993)).
91. With one exception, the essays in the second section of Freedom'sLaw concern the
constitutional principle of free speech. The exception is Chapter 11, which provides a
defense of the related principle of academic freedom. Academic freedom is not a strict
subset of freedom of speech both because universities are unusual communities, see Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991), and because many universities are private, and
therefore not subject to the requirements of the First Amendment.
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responsibility to make up their own minds about matters of justice or
conscience (p. 200). This principle implies broader protection than the
most common instrumental justification-the notion that truth is likely
to emerge in a free marketplace of ideas. Dworkin argues that if speech
were only protected for this instrumental reason, it would be permissible
to censor speech that, as a categorical matter, appeared unlikely to contribute to human knowledge. Although he acknowledges that such censorship would call for difficult line-drawing, he sees no reason to conclude that the task would be insurmountable, allowing that the most
virulent forms of hate speech could be suppressed without seriously imperiling more valuable speech (pp. 203-04).92
Dworkin connects his non-instrumental defense of free speech to the
legitimacy of government. Government forfeits a substantial claim to legitimacy, Dworkin argues, "when it disqualifies some people from exercising" their responsibility to form and communicate their own convictions
"on the ground that their convictions make them unworthy participants"
(p. 200). 9 3 Dworkin invokes this principle to defend the application of
First Amendment protection to pornography (pp. 214-43), and to criticize some aspects of the Supreme Court's approach to defamation law.9 4
The non-instrumental moral principle of free speech is, for Dworkin,
merely an instance of the political and legal ideals that he finds in the
Constitution, namely:
[G]overnment must treat all those subject to its dominion as
having equal moral and political status; it must attempt, in good
faith, to treat them all with equal concern; and it must respect
whatever individual freedoms are indispensable to those ends,
including but not limited to the freedoms more specifically designated in the document, such as the freedom of speech and
religion. (Pp. 7-8.) 9 5
92. Dworkin does not, however, entirely eschew the slippery slope argument. Instead,
he cautions the reader to "[b]eware principles you can trust only in the hands of people
who think as you do" (p. 225).

98. Cf. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and
Politics 94-98, 145-49 (1994) (offering similar defense of liberalism based on perfectionist
premises).
94. Although Dworkin generally approves of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 876 U.S.
254 (1964), he offers two criticisms. First, he contends that the distinction between
defamation actions by public officials and those by ordinary people assumes that political
speech is more important than other kinds of speech, an assumption that rests on what
Dworkin sees as the mistaken view that the First Amendment is primarily a means, rather
than an end (pp. 193-94). Second, Dworkin dislikes the subjective element of Sullivanthe requirement that the plaintiff prove recklessness on the part of the press-because it
makes reporters' notes and files relevant to a defamation action, and therefore subject to
formal discovery motions (p. 190). This criticism, along with Dworkin's proposal that
Sullivan be partially replaced by a retraction option (pp. 192-93), rests primarily on
instrumental concerns.
95. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law
39-41 (1969) (arguing that the structure of American government would prohibit state
infringement of free speech even if there had been no First Amendment).
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Thus, freedom of speech does not receive protection simply because the
First Amendment specifically identifies free speech. Instead, for persons
to have equal moral and political status, government must respect the
right of free speech.
What other freedoms must government respect? The language
quoted above tells us to include free exercise of religion as well as the
other freedoms protected by the express language of the Constitution.
Dworkin's discussion of abortion makes clear that procreative autonomy
is similarly essential (p. 111). What method does Dworkin propose for
identifying those freedoms that are essential to equal moral and political
status? To make the matter more concrete, what justifies Dworkin's conclusion that the freedom to enter a-contract to labor for less than the
minimum wage or for longer than the maximum number of hours per
week is not required by his principle of equal moral and political status
(pp. 125,

208)?96

Dworkin answers that no formula can demonstrate that Lochner v.
New York97 was wrongly decided; all we can do about "bad decisions is to
point out how and where the arguments are bad" (p. 82). This is a fair
point, but it tends to confuse Dworkin's claim that the freedoms he defends as essential to equal dignity are non-instrumental.
Consider two arguments against treating freedom of contract as an
essential freedom. First, one could argue that the freedom of contract
differs from, say, procreative autonomy or speech. Freedom of contract
does not figure into a person's self-definition in the same way that these
other, protected freedoms do. Moreover, perhaps people value economic freedom less than they value procreative autonomy or speech.
Second, one could point to concrete harms associated with freedom
of contract as grounds for permitting interference with freedom of contract. Given the unequal bargaining strength of labor and management,
permitting workers to agree to whatever terms the market dictates means
that workers will accept far less than management would be otherwise
willing to offer. Moreover, at a macroeconomic level, regulation may be
deemed necessary to ameliorate the effects of the business cycle. At least
government regusince the late 1930s, the Supreme Court has permitted
98
lation predicated on assumptions such as these.
Dworkin is thus correct that there are good arguments for rejecting
the claims of economic libertarians. The problem, however, is that there
are also good arguments for rejecting claims for freedom of speech-and
their structure resembles the structure of the economic arguments. 99
96. The question is not purely hypothetical. Reviewing Freedom'sLaw, Richard Epstein
chided Dworkin for giving short shrift to economic rights. See Richard A. Epstein, The
First Freedoms, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1996, § 7 (Book Rev.), at 12.

97. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
98. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937).
99. In addition to the parallels explained below, similarities exist between the
marketplace of ideas rationale for free speech and economic libertarianism. Cass Sunstein
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Although some kinds of speech no doubt play an important constitutive
function for many people, this is hardly true for all speech, or for all
people. And just as we might say that a person who defined herself in
terms of her paycheck has chosen an unworthy self-definition, so we
might say the same about one who defines herself in terms of her ability
to produce or consume pornography. Moreover, as a subjective matter, it
is a contestable proposition that people value speech. Certainly many
people would value economic well-being over the right to express
themselves.
Similarly, one might point to concrete harms associated with particular kinds of speech as a justification for limiting that speech. Dworkin
cites a number of studies finding no clear evidence of a causal connection between pornography and sexual crimes (pp. 206, 230, 375
nn.21-22, 378 n.4). But if pornography were not protected speech, the
government would not bear the burden of proof on such questions; it
would be a sufficient basis for regulation if one could hypothesize a rational connection between the subject of regulation and the harm. 100
Just as the Court accepts the plausibility of the harms associated with freedom of contract, it would accept the plausibility of the harms associated
with pornography.
What, then, justifies treating speech-or to be more precise, certain
categories of speech, such as pornography' 0 1-differently from economic liberty? As Dworkin says, the arguments for economic liberty are
bad, while presumably the arguments for free speech are good. But what
exactly does it mean for an argument to be bad, or unconvincing?
has argued that both the Lochner Court's view of the market and the modem Court's view
of the marketplace of ideas rest on what he calls "status quo neutrality." Cass R. Sunstein,
The Partial Constitution 40-41, 154-55 (1993). According to Sunstein, during the Lochner
era, the Court treated the complex common law rules about contract and property as if
they were natural, artificially deeming non-enforcement policies as interference. See id. at
45-48. Similarly, he argues that the modem Court acts as though specific speech-limiting
laws infringe free speech, while ignoring the impact of the vast network of background
government regulation that shapes the exercise of speech rights. See id. at 228-30.
100. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (holding that
"[ilt is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it").
101. Some have argued that pornography should not be protected because it is more
properly characterized as sexual paraphernalia than as speech. According to this view,
pornographic images are no more speech than other, non-expressive masturbatory aids.
Dworkin rejects this claim because pornography produces arousal via mental
intermediation (pp. 240-42). See also American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing how pornography's effects, like all speech,
depends on mental intermediation, and is therefore no different in this respect from
subversive political speech). This is a somewhat strange rejoinder, because mental activity
almost always plays a role in sexual arousal, even when no images or descriptions are
employed. See Kevin W. Saunders, Media Self-Regulation of Depictions of Violence: A
Last Opportunity, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 445, 474 (1994) (arguing that mental intermediation
involved in pornography-based arousal is not sufficiently distinguishable from other types
of sexual arousal).
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Dworkin might mean that he finds the empirical assumptions underlying
the case for economic liberty to be considerably more dubious than those
underlying the case for a broad principle of free speech. This is a perfectly reasonable reaction, but note that it rests protection for free speech
on an instrumental basis.
For Dworkin to rest his case for free speech on a non-instrumental
justification, he must make the claim that, as an intrinsic matter, the ability to form and express ideas free of coercion by the state is essential to
equal respect, whereas the ability to form contracts with no interference
by the state is not. This claim may strike many readers as a proper normative judgment. Note, however, that on this understanding, protection for
free speech does not follow from the idea of equal dignity; the notion that
speech must be free is an unprovable first principle of constitutional
government.
If Dworkin truly means to give a non-instrumental justification for
free speech, then in answer to the question 'Why must speech be
free?", 10 2 he must offer a theory of personhood in which speech plays a
more important role than, say, economic activity. Moreover, he must
confront the fact that many readers of the Constitution will reject such a
theory. To be sure, Dworkin can make a plausible case that a non-instrumental theory of free speech provides the best fit with existing doctrine.
Art, music, and literature all enjoy robust First Amendment protection,
even though they may have little to do with the search for truth or political accountability (pp. 233, 238).103 But if we assume that a narrower
view of the First Amendment would also fit our constitutional tradition,
then, as in the case of abortion, Dworkin does not have a strategy for
convincing those who, after reflection, think free speech intrinsically
unimportant.
C. EvaluatingDworkin's Moral Reading
Readers who share Dworkin's moral sensibilities (as I do), will find
his case for an abortion right and a broad right of free speech convincing. What about readers with different moral sensibilities? They will reconcile the demands of fit and morality differently. Does the inevitability
of disagreement undermine Dworkin's case for a moral reading? To answer this question, let us engage in a Dworkinian thought experiment.
Imagine that it is 1973, and Justice Hercules 10 4 must decide Roe v.
Wade. He begins with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Let us suppose that he comes up with three candidate principles:
(1) the Constitution protects only those rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights; (2) the Constitution protects a right of procreational and sexual
102. This is the title of Chapter 8 of Freedom'sLaw.

103. See also Whimey v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Framers "valued liberty both as an end and as a means").
104. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
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autonomy, limited by harms to third parties; (3) the Constitution protects
an absolute right of procreational and sexual autonomy. The requirement of fit will quickly dispose of the first and third conceptions.
Hercules adopts the second principle.
The second principle does not, however, decide the case. Hercules
must ask the further question of whether and when abortion constitutes a
harm to third parties. This is partly a question of fit. Hercules can look
to how our legal system generally treats fetuses. Can they inherit? Does
the state punish battery of a pregnant woman more severely when it results in the destruction of the fetus? Let us assume that Hercules concludes that a wide range of answers to the question of whether abortion
constitutes harm to a third party would fit our constitutional law satisfactorily. He must now ask what answer will show that law in its best light.
This is the moral question.
Suppose that Hercules believes that all human life has intrinsic value,
and that abortion almost always diminishes or insults that intrinsic value.
According to Dworkin's argument in Freedom'sLaw, Hercules must disregard this view because it rests on a quasi-religious foundation. He must
disregard it because
[a] state may not curtail liberty, in order to protect an intrinsic
value, (1) when the decisions it forbids are matters of personal
commitment on essentially religious issues, (2) when the community is divided about what the best understanding of the
value in question requires, and (3) when the decision has a very
great and disparate impact on the person whose decision is displaced. (Pp. 101-02 (footnote omitted).)
This three-fold principle sounds like a proposition of liberal pluralism. If
Hercules accepts it, he must rule for the plaintiff in Roe.' 0 5 But why
should Hercules accept pluralism? Presumably, Dworkin would argue
that it fits and justifies our constitutional practice better than any competing principle.
Notice, however, that we have assumed that a ruling for the state in
Roe would fit well enough with our constitutional system to count as a
plausible interpretation. Hercules may believe that some competing
principle is more just than pluralism-at least in the context of this case.
Perhaps, like most Americans, Hercules' religion is very important in his
life, 10 6 and he does not believe it possible to isolate his views about the
ultimate meaning and purpose of human life from his legal decisions.
Some comprehensive moral views deny that government should act in a
way that remains neutral with respect to individual conceptions of the
105. I am assuming that Hercules also accepts Dworkin's contention that the state
lacks derivative interests in the fetus.
106. See Gustav Niebuhr, Religious Beliefs and Practices of Five Religious Groupings,
N.Y. TimesJune 25, 1996, atA18 (reporting results of poll by Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press, finding that 59% of respondents say religion is very important in
their lives).
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good. Some of these comprehensive views in turn insist that abortion
must be illegal under most circumstances. If Hercules rejects pluralism
in favor of such a comprehensive moral view, he will think that American
constitutionalism's traditional concern for liq, liberty and property would
be put in its best possible light by protecting the rights of the unborn. If
so, he would only adopt the pluralist principle if he believed that principle fit American constitutionalism so much better than the alternative
that sacrificing ideal justice for the sake of fit would be warranted.
If Hercules holds the views I have attributed to him, Dworkin cannot
ultimately convince Hercules that he should rule for the plaintiff in Roe.
But that is not a reason why someone who agrees with pluralism should
reject Dworkin's argument. As Dworkin explains in his critique of Oliver
Wendell Holmes's moral skepticism, if someone believes a moral proposition, the fact that she cannot prove its truth in the same way that one
proves scientific propositions does not in any way undermine the fact that
she believes the moral proposition to be true. 0 7 Plainly it would have
been a serious mistake for Justice Brennan to have voted for the state in
Roe simply because his colleague Justice Hercules (or White or Rehnquist) was unconvinced of the soundness of pluralism.
Dworkin's argument may appear paradoxical. In justifying a principle that requires deference to individual conscience when the community
is deeply divided (criterion number two about "religious" views), how can
Dworkin ignore the fact that the community is (let us assume) deeply
divided about the principle of deference to individual conscience itself?.
This is not a paradox so much as it is a confusion, however. Liberal democracy of the sort Dworkin advances claims that government must remain neutral with respect to some subset of people's conception of the
good. However, as a constellation of propositions of political morality,
liberalism cannot be neutral with respect to political morality itself. Liberalism asserts values that may or may not be shared by any given
108
person.
At this point it might appear that the differences between Dworkin
on the one hand and anti-realists and postmodernists on the other be107. See pp. 340-42 (contrasting Holmes's skepticism with Learned Hand's
skepticism); see also Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 78-85 (contrasting external

and internal skepticism).
108. Dworkin is well aware of the problem. See Dworkin, Rights, supra note 2, at

234-38; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 185, 197-204 (1981) (discussing difficulty in achieving equality of people's
preferences in community where diverse political theories are held); see also Larry
Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 763,
764 (1993) (suggesting that "the liberalism I endorse is itselfjust a sectarian view on the
same level as the religious and other views that it purports to be neutral about and to
tolerate"); Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation,

Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 581, 612-13,
650-51 (1993) (discussing the paradox of liberalism-which requires tolerance for the
intolerant).
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come critical. The disagreement over whether to accept a particular liberal conception of political morality would not trouble Dworkin because
he insists that, even if others disagree, liberalism provides the right answers to moral questions. By contrast, an anti-realist or a conventionalist
postmodernist such as Patterson would view the disagreement over abortion (prior to the decision in Roe) as an indication that the law is indeterminate on this question. Accordingly, he might worry about the legitimacy of a body such as the Supreme Court deciding the case. 10 9
Recall, however, that in practice Dworkin uses the same techniques
to argue for his view as postmodemists use to argue for theirs. A
Dworkinian judge, like a postmodern judge, chooses the interpretation
that best hangs together with everything else he takes to be true. When
two Dworkinianjudges disagree about which moral principles are right, it
matters little that they agree that some principle is right. That agreement
typically will not move them to agree on the resolution of the particular
case.
None of the above discussion should be taken to imply that
Dworkin's approach is unworkable. A certain level of discord in constitutional adjudication is tolerable; indeed it is inevitable. Nonetheless, the
more discord one encounters, the more one senses that contested principles of morality are drowning out the criteria of fit. The case for the
moral reading would therefore be strengthened by some indication that
its basic feature-the requirement that the Constitution be treated as a
charter of principle rather than mere expediency-facilitates agreement.
Toward that end, Dworkin's project would benefit were he (or someone
else) to apply the moral reading to issues that produce less profound
moral disagreement than the questions of life and death on which
Dworkin has thus far concentrated. 110 In the next and final Part, I argue
that despite his suggestion to the contrary in Freedom's Law (p. 4), the
moral reading should apply to nearly all constitutional interpretation,
and that a defense of such a broadened moral reading would greatly
strengthen Dworkin's argument.
IV. Tia

SCOPE OF TiE MORAL READlING

Although Dworkin defends the moral reading only in the context of
individual rights, in this Part I contend that his argument logically extends to all constitutional interpretation. To explain why this is so, I be109. Patterson, following Bobbitt, does not himself worry about the legitimacy of

having the Supreme Court decide contested moral questions (Patterson, pp. 129-32). In
my view, he ought to, although this is not to say that Supreme Court decisions in this area

are illegitimate. See generally Michael C. Doff, Integrating Normative and Descriptive
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Originalism, 85 Geo. LJ. (forthcoming May 1997).
110. Perhaps for this reason, Dworkin is at his best when discussing the question of
"whether the Endangered Species Act gives the secretary of the interior power to halt a
vast, almost finished federal power project to save a small and ecologically uninteresting
fish." Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 313.
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gin by re-examining the reasons Dworkin gives in support of the moral
reading.
A. Justificationsfor the Moral Reading
What is the basis for the moral reading? First consider the answer
that appears most prominently in Freedom'sLaw: the Constitution embodies moral principles because the most natural reading of its text and the
history of its adoption suggest that the Framers of the Constitution intended to lay down moral principles. Dworkin makes this point clearly in
the Introduction to Freedom's Law. In arguing against those forms of
originalism that look to the concrete expectations of the Framers, he
states that the relevant inquiry concerns what the Framers intended to
say, not what other intentions they may have had (pp. 9-12).
In some parts of Freedom'sLaw, Dworkin suggests that the words "due
process," "equal protection," and "freedom of speech" by themselves require a moral reading (p. 7). The plain meaning of such abstract terms,
Dworkin contends, will entail abstract rights. Thus, according to this argument, we should infer that the Framers intended a moral reading from
the fact that they used words that imply a moral reading. The difficulty
here, as with all plain meaning arguments, is that it depends on an assertion. Many readers will find ambiguity in the language Dworkin deems
plainly moral. The Due Process Clause, after all, could reasonably be
read as establishing merely procedural norms. In any event, if the point
of the plain meaning argument is to discern what its drafters intended to
say, there is no reason not to consider that question directly."1 '
In the case of the Equal Protection Clause, Dworkin contends that
the Framers intended to enact a broad principle: "that government must
treat everyone as of equal status and with equal concern" (p. 10). The
important point for present purposes is not what principle the Framers
intended to enact, so much as the fact that we look for a principle because they intended one. I shall call this the actual intent reason for seeking interpretations of principle, because it rests on the assumption that
the framers actually intended to enact a particular moral principle.
Next consider a different basis for seeking an interpretation of principle. Suppose that ajudge wants to find the actual intent of the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but upon confronting the historical evidence she discovers a muddle. Some of those who supported it intended
the words "equal protection of the laws" to mean roughly what Dworkin
takes the words to mean, the broad principle of equal status and concern.
Others, however, understood the words as a shorthand for formal political
equality rather than social equality. 1 2 They, no less than those with the
broader view, intended to enact a principle, albeit a different one. Still
111. Moreover, I argue below that the plain meaning view is broadly inconsistent with
Dworkin's interpretive method. See infra text accompanying notes 118-124.
112. See Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 2337-43.
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others of the Amendment's supporters intended merely to restate propositions they believed were already contained in the Constitution, but to
make clear that Congress has the authority to enforce them against the
States. 113 Finally, suppose a great number of the Amendment's supporters gave no thought whatsoever to questions of principle, but merely supported the measure because they thought it would achieve certain concrete results they favored.
The actual intent approach would yield an indeterminate answer to
the question of whether the amendment embodies a principle and, if so,
what principle. Indeed, because amendments are always adopted in
stages by multi-member bodies and for multiple purposes, it would seem
that the actual intent approach will never yield a determinate intent,
principled or otherwise. Thus, the judge must construct the intent. As
Dworkin argues in Law's Empire, ajudge who begins by seeking the actual
intent of the legislature will inevitably be led to an interpretive project,
asking what principle would have served as the best justification for the
provision adopted. 1 14 I call this the constructive intent approach, because
the judge must construct an abstract principle to enforce. She does not
simply find it in the text or history of the provision's adoption.
Although Freedom's Law sometimes reads as if Dworkin is relying
upon actual intent, he never marshals the kind of evidence that would be
necessary to infer an actual intent. Moreover, he has consistently argued
that actual intent may be indeterminate. Consequently, when Dworkin
states that the Framers intended to enact a particular broad principle, he
should be understood as referring to their constructive rather than their
actual intent.
Once we recognize that the Framers' intent is constructed by the
judge (or other interpreter), however, continued talk of intent is misleading. Dworkin is not really talking about the ideals of the Framers at all,
but the ideals that best justify particular constitutional provisions.
Dworkin's direct political argument for interpreting the Constitution
as containing moral principles does not differ significantly from his political argument for law as integrity generally. 1 15 He seeks a view of the law
that legitimates the state's monopoly of coercive force."16 Law as integrity emerges as a satisfactory conception because it best explains the obli113. See Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political CompromiseSection One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 Ohio St. UJ. 933, 935-37
(1984) (describing political factions in Congress that proposed Fourteenth Amendment).
114. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 327-33.
115. Parts of Law's Empiresuggest that the principle of integrity follows inevitably from
the idea of interpretation itself. See, e.g., id. at 52-53 (discussing interpretation of custom
of courtesy); id. at 55-57 (discussing interpretation in art). In my view, however, Dworkin
means to rest his argument for integrity in law on his arguments of political philosophy.
For a critique of these arguments, see Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency. On
Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 Yale LJ. 2031, 2037 (1996)
(maintaining that deontological accounts of precedent fail).
116. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 190-92.
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gations of members of a community to obey the law even when they disagree with the law. By requiring that the actions of the state be
principled, law as integrity accords members of the community equal
respect. This means, Dworkin argues, that differences in treatment must
be justified by7 differences in principle, not merely by political
compromises."
Thus, Dworkin argues that the moral reading is the right one mainly
because it follows from the best understanding of the principle ofjustice
that holds that government must treat people with equal dignity. If one
agrees, Dworkin has met half his burden; he has connected the moral
reading to principles ofjustice. But what about fit? Does the moral reading fit the actual practice of constitutional law? Certainly, Dworkin is correct that some of the landmark decisions of our era are best explained by
the moral reading. The most familiar example is Brown, which Dworkin
uses to criticize originalism and as affirmative support for the moral reading. More recently, the majority opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
seems self-consciously to adopt the moral reading and law as integrity, as
Dworkin effectively shows in Chapter Four of Freedom'sLaw (pp. 117-29).
In showing that the moral reading fits the practice of interpreting
the concepts of equal protection, due process, and free speech, Dworkin
has accomplished a great deal. Still, the Constitution contains many
other important provisions. The subtitle of Freedom's Law is The Moral
Reading of the American Constitution, not The Moral Reading of a Few
Very Important Individual Rights Provisions of the American Constitution. What is the true scope of the moral reading?
B. The Moral Reading Beyond Liberty and Equality
In the Introduction to Freedom's Law, Dworkin states that not every
clause of the Constitution enacts a moral principle (p. 8). This position is
at odds with his more general interpretive commitments. He would do
better to argue that the whole of the Constitution calls for the moral
reading, although for some provisions the moral aspects will typically play
a negligible role.
First consider Dworkin's own example: the requirement that the
11
8 The requirement
President be at least thirty-five years old (p. 8).
seems straightforward enough. Because any precise cut-off will be somewhat arbitrary, it makes sense to treat the provision as a reasonable, if
arbitrary, line. The Constitution could have specified that the President
be "sufficiently mature" for the responsibilities of the office. Such a provision might require the kind ofjustificatory interpretation that Dworkin
believes necessary in the case of terms like due process or equal protec117. See id. at 190-216.
118. Dworkin gives another example of a constitutional requirement that does not
enact a moral principle-the Third Amendment's prohibition on the quartering of

soldiers in private homes during peacetime (pp. 8-9).
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tion. Given the concrete language of the actual constitutional age requirement, however, Dworkin treats it as something less than a moral
principle.
In virtually any case we can imagine arising under the Presidential
age requirement, the resolution of the question seems clear. Either
someone has "attained to the Age of thirty five Years," 1 9 or has not. Even
the hero of Gilbert and Sullivan's Piratesof Penzance, born on February
20
29th, presents an easy case.'
An only slightly harder case would be presented were a person delivered by Caesarian section within the United States to seek the Presidency.
The same sentence requiring the President to be thirty-five years old requires that he or she be a "natural born Citizen." To be sure, "Macduff
was from his mother's womb / Untimely ripp'd," 12 1 and thus could kill
Macbeth, notwithstanding the prophesy that "none of woman born /
Shall harm Macbeth." 122 But the Bard's wordplay provides an unconvincing precedent for constitutional adjudication.
Why is the Caesarian case easy? Recall that for Dworkin, the same
interpretive method operates in hard cases as in easy cases. The word
"born" is not inherently ambiguous or unambiguous. We can imagine
usages in which it distinguishes between vaginal births and Caesarian deliveries. But it would serve no sensible purpose to render all persons delivered by Caesarian section ineligible for the Presidency. Thus, we would
interpret "born" broadly to refer to anyone delivered in the United
States. It is not quite right to say that the moral (that is, principled) reading does not apply to the case; rather, the correct moral reading is
obvious.
Now consider another seemingly technical constitutional provision,
the requirement that "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives." 23 Does the longstanding practice under
which the President initially proposes a budget violate this requirement,
or does the requirement only govern relations between the House and
the Senate? Let us put aside issues of judicial competence, and assume
that the President himself wishes to answer this question. He has a sworn
duty to uphold the Constitution, and does not wish to violate it.
One reading would seem to condemn the established practice. If
the President proposes the details of the budget, it does not "originate in
the House." On the other hand, in the form the President presents his
budget it is not, strictly speaking, a "Bill." Either reading is textually plausible. The fact that Presidents and Congresses have long accepted the
practice of presidential proposal strongly implies that the practice fits our
119. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
120. See W.S. Gilbert & A. Sullivan, Pirates of Penzance (1880).

121. William Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 5, sc. 8, v. 15-16, in The Riverside
Shakespeare 1339 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974).
122. Id. at 1329, act 4, sc. 1, v. 80-81.

123. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, ci. 1
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constitutional tradition quite well. Still, the President may believe that
his predecessors and previous Congresses never considered the constitutionality of the practice, simply following it because it was expedient. Unlike the courts, political actors do not typically engage in self-conscious
justification of their conduct-even if ideally they should. Thus, the
longstanding political practice may not be entitled to much weight.
Let us assume that the President believes that interpreting the practice of presidential proposal as consistent with the Constitution better fits
our constitutional tradition, but interpreting the practice as unconstitutional is not automatically disqualified on the grounds of fit. He must
then apply criteria ofjustice. At this point, one would expect Dworkin to
urge the President to invoke the moral reading. What principle justifies
the requirement that revenue bills originate in the House? One plausible
answer is that because members of the House are elected from the smallest units that receive representation at the national level, the requirement
ensures that revenue bills will be sensitive to public opinion at a local
level. The provision captures the moral principle that there should be
"no taxation without representation." If the President accepts this answer, he may conclude that the practice of presidential proposal is inconsistent with the moral principle. He would then have to see whether this
moral consideration is sufficient to overcome the fact that a conclusion of
constitutionality better fits the historical pattern than does the conclusion
that principles of justice counsel.
In theory, the interpretation of any constitutional provision will
sometimes call for an assessment of the provision as a moral principle.
Thus, Dworkin's theory is best understood as proposing a moral reading
of the whole Constitution.
Recognizing that the moral reading is a strategy for all of constitutional interpretation would help dispel the common charge that
124
Dworkin'sjurisprudence is rigged to produce politically liberal results.
Dworkin resists this charge in two ways. First, he contends that it is unfair
to suppose that one's political philosophy would not influence one's interpretation of the Constitution (pp. 36-37). Second, Dworkin argues
that the moral reading is not monolithic. He notes that when political
conservatives argue that the Equal Protection Clause forbids most forms
of affirmative action, they are engaging in a moral reading (p. 37).
Dworkin's responses to the charge of result-orientation are legitimate, but they would be strengthened by some illustrations of how the
moral reading may be employed to reach answers one did not suspect he
endorsed in advance. In the case of affirmative action, after all, Dworkin
devotes his energy to showing that the conservative reading is an errone124. For example, Patterson approvingly cites Jeffrey Rosen's complaint that
"'[w]hen push comes to shove... legal practice does not seem to constrain Dworkin in
any meaningful way'" (Patterson, p. 92 n.125 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, "A Womb with a
View," The New Republic, June 14, 1993, at 35, 36)).
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ous moral reading (p. 155).125 While Dworkin admits that the best interpretation of the Constitution does not require wealth redistribution (p.
11),126 even though his ideal constitution would, this is a rather minimal
concession: whatever chances a redistributive vision of the Constitution
once had,127 its prospects appear especially bleak today.' 28
The moral reading may be tested in an area that is emerging as one
of the major battlegrounds of constitutional law: the proper balance of
power between the state and national governments. Since 1992, the
Supreme Court has invoked principles of federalism to invalidate: a federal requirement that some states take title to low-level radioactive
waste; 129 a federal prohibition on possession of a firearm in school
zones;' 3 0 and a federal statute authorizing Indian tribes to sue states for
failure to comply with regulations concerning gambling on reservations.13 1 Moreover, in 1995, the Court came within one vote of uphold32
ing state-imposed term limits on the state's Congressional delegation.'
The dissenters in that case endorsed the view that the Constitution is a
states, rather than of the
creation of the people of the several sovereign
33
people of the United States as a whole.'
In each of the recent federalism cases, the (politically conservative)
champions of robust judicial protection of state sovereignty have insisted
that the Constitution enshrines state sovereignty as a matter of principle,
pointing to the text of the Tenth Amendment and the Constitution's
overall structure. Conversely, the proponents of national power have argued that the Constitution commits protection of state sovereign prerogatives to the political branches.'34 For example, they contend that the fact
125. See also Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 393-97.
126. But see Edward B. Foley, Interpretation and Philosophy: Dworkin's
Constitution, 14 Const. Commentary (forthcoming Jan. 1997) (manuscript at 29-31, on
file with Columbia Law Review) (criticizing Dworkin for failing to consider constitutional
right to living wage).
127. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 10 (1969)
(discussing equal protection claims that "government must spend its revenues in order to
satisfy certain wants felt by its impecunious citizens").
128. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modem Takings Doctrine and
Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 1996) (stating that
Supreme Court's current6 takings doctrine represents similarity to Lochner Court, in that
it views redistributive legislation unfavorably).
129. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
130. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
131. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
182. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
133. See id. at 1875-76 (Thomas,J.,joined by Rehnquist, CJ., O'Connor & Scalia,JJ.,
dissenting).
134. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1185 (Souter, J., dissenting); United States Term
Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1872 (KennedyJ, concurring); Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1639 (KennedyJ.,
joined by O'ConnorJ, concurring); NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. at 205 (WhiteJ,
joined by Blackmun & Stevens, 5., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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a state-wide basis ensures that
that United States Senators are selected on
35
Congress will be sensitive to state needs.'
By entrusting the protection of state sovereignty to the political
branches, the advocates of national power would reverse the interpretive
strategy proposed by Judge Learned Hand. Concerned about the
counter-majoitarian difficulty, Hand argued that the Court should defer
to the political branches in cases involving individual rights, resolving
constitutional questions only when there is a conflict among different
units of government. Although Dworkin is a great admirer of Hand, he
disagrees with Hand's policy of deference in cases involving individual
rights (pp. 332-47). What would Dworkin say about deference in cases
involving claims of state sovereignty?
Consider, for example, the principle announced in New York v.
United States.' 3 6 In that case, the Court invalidated a federal statutory provision requiring states to "take tide" to low-level radioactive waste within
their jurisdictions in the event that they did not comply with federal deadlines for treatment and disposal of such waste. 137 The majority construed
the take-title provision as a directive from Congress to a state legislature
ordering the latter to enact a law, and went on to announce that the
the power to "commandeer" the state legislative
federal government lacks
138
apparatus in this way.
If the federal structure of American government is merely an expedient means of allocating power, then the decision in New York is perplexing. Indeed, it may even be perverse, for if the federal government lacks
the power to commandeer the state legislative apparatus, the consequence may well be that the federal government will simply preempt the
field and regulate directly, thereby entirely displacing state regulatory authority. 13 9 In other words, the practical effect of New York may be to increase federal power at the expense of the states.
The case takes on a different complexion, however, if we envision
federalism as embodying the moral principle of state sovereignty. Just as
individual rights may not be violated merely because it is expedient-or
even in the interest of the right-holder-so the federal government may
not interfere with state prerogatives because it is expedient, even if doing
so would increase state power relative to the alternative. On the assumption that the New York majority was correct to view the commandeering of
state legislative processes as inconsistent with state sovereignty, then taking states' rights seriously required the result the Court reached.
135. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985).
136. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
137. See id. at 153-54 (describing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C) (1994)).
138. See id. at 175-76.
139. See Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States. An Essay on the Uses and Misuses
of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. Kan.
L. Rev. 498, 524 (1993).
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At the very least, the jurisprudential approach set forth in Freedom's
Law requires that in a close case, a Dworkinianjudge would seek an interpretation of the Tenth Amendment and the Constitution as a whole that
treats state sovereignty as a matter of principle, rather than expediency.
This raises a difficult question, however. What moral principle does the
Tenth Amendment embody? The most obvious candidate would appear
to be a principle of democracy: some categories of decisions should be
made by bodies representing political entities smaller than the entire nation, because these relatively local bodies will generally be more responsive to local concerns. 140 Yet this explanation is problematic in Dworkin's
scheme. Localism and decentralization may be legitimate moral principles, but they do not in any way explain why the relevant boundaries
should be state boundaries. Perhaps granting significant authority to the
Rhode Island state government serves a kind of localism, but can the
same be said of granting significant authority to the California or New
York state government?
Moreover, the most logical local units will often consist of metropolitan areas including pieces of several states. Our constitutional system permits the creation of interstate coalitions to address regional concerns, but
it does not give such coalitions the protected status it accords to states.
Indeed, if we look beyond the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution's most basic means of protecting federalism, the moral reading becomes especially strained. In the interest of federalism, the
Constitution contains a virtually unamendable guarantee of unequal
political representation in the national legislature-the assignment of
two Senators to each state.' 4 1 This arrangement appears to be a serious
deviation from Dworkin's notion that at a minimum a constitutional democracy should treat all of its citizens with equal respect.
Let me be clear about the claim I am making. The difficulty with the
Senate is not merely that its composition enables a minority to frustrate
the will of the majority. Dworkin rightly notes that constitutional democracy need not mean simple majoritarianism. The problem is that the
structure of the Senate gives to some voters a grossly disproportionate
ability to frustrate the will of the majority-and it does so without any
substantial contemporary justification. In a federal system consisting of
states with significantly different ethnic, religious, cultural, or political
identities, one could justify giving a minority group an effective veto
power over some matters in the interest of preventing hegemony by the
dominant group. But that justification surely does not apply to the
United States at the end of the twentieth century.
140. In addition, as the Framers of the Constitution argued, dividing power between
the federal and state governments serves to protect liberty by ensuring that neither
government becomes too powerful.
141. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. The provision is essentially unamendable
because the Constitution also provides that no state may be deprived of its equal suffrage
in the Senate without its consent. See U.S. Const. art. V.
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Viewed from the perspective of ideal justice, our federal system is
aberrant, but of course our federal system was not designed to serve ideal
justice. It was the result of a political compromise at the Founding. 142 In
exchange for sacrificing some of their sovereignty to the Union, the states
were guaranteed equal representation in the Senate, as well as concessions embodied in other provisions of the Constitution that serve the interests of states as such. Perhaps the distinctiveness of the various states
justified treating them as separate political communities at the Founding.
If so, our federalist system was at one time a matter of principle; yet that
does not make it so today.
It would appear that in contemporary terms one of the essential features of our Constitution-federalism-violates the core requirement of
Dworkin's moral reading-equal respect. How might Dworkin resolve
the tension? He might claim that the moral reading does not apply to all
of the Constitution, but only to those portions that fairly appear to embody moral principles. As I noted above, this strategy is inconsistent with
Dworkin's claim that the same interpretive method applies in easy cases
and hard cases. Dworkin makes that claim in Law's Empire' 43 precisely
because of the difficulty that would otherwise ensue if one had to develop
a theory for distinguishing between easy and hard cases or, analogously,
for distinguishing between provisions that embody moral principles and
provisions that do not.
Perhaps Dworkin might say that an interpreter should always strive to
give a constitutional provision a moral reading, and only treat it as something less-a naked political bargain or an historical artifact-if no moral
reading can make sense of the provision. Such a limited version of the
moral reading would reconcile Dworkin's treatment of due process, equal
protection, and free speech on the one hand, and what I believe would
be his treatment of federalism, on the other. However, this strategy raises
other troubling questions for Dworkin's theory.
If one thought that the provisions of the Constitution protecting federalism were aberrant, then it might be possible to treat them as exceptions to a general rule requiring a moral reading. But that is clearly not
the case. For one thing, federalism itself is a pervasive and central feature
of the Constitution. In addition, there are other provisions of the
Constitution that seem to be best explained in historical terms. For example, Daniel Lazare argues that the venerable principle of separation of
powers hamstrings modem government; although it may have originally
served as a principled means of preserving liberty, he contends that
under modem conditions it simply prevents necessary corrective
action.'4
142. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We The People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 142-47 (1996).

143. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 4, at 353-54.
144. See generally Daniel Lazare, Frozen Republic:
Paralyzing Democracy (1996).
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If Lazare is right, then the domain of the moral reading shrinks further. Were the domain very small, one would have to conclude that the
moral reading does not fit the Constitution at all. At that point, Dworkin
would have to proffer some special reason-beyond his general interpretive theory-why the individual rights provisions of the Constitution command a moral reading, while the rest of the Constitution does not. I do
not mean to suggest that this task would be impossible. There is, after all,
something of a tradition of seeing the Bill of Rights (along with the Fourteenth Amendment) as a freestanding charter of liberties with a status
somewhat separate from the rest of the Constitution. 14 5 But given the
generally universal character of Dworkin's theory, accomplishing the task
would seem to require considerable effort.
The root of the difficulty I have identified may be that Dworkin's
vision of law as integrity has always been a better description of common
law adjudication than of statutory or constitutional interpretation. When
a common law judge finds that an entrenched rule of the common law is
unprincipled, or does not fit with the rest of the law, the judge can disavow the rule. However, legislatures sometimes enact statutes that cannot
be understood as anything other than naked political compromises.
Worse still, some such provisions worked their way into the
Constitution-in, for example, the composition of the Senate, or, more
shamefully, the original Constitution's acceptance of slavery. At least
where the constitutional text is not susceptible to a moral reading, a
judge must accept such brutish provisions, and perhaps try to ameliorate
46
their effects.'
In cases involving equal protection, due process, and free speech,
two factors mask the limits of Dworkin's method. First, these principles
themselves have close analogues in the common law, so that, for example,
a judge interpreting the equal protection guarantee can act largely as
though she is following the common law requirement that like cases be
treated alike. Second, there is by now such a rich collection of cases interpreting each provision that in any new case the court's primary focus
will be on interpretation of the earlier cases rather than the text itself.
This is a characteristically common law method.
This second factor applies more generally. Thus, even if I am right
that constitutional requirements such as federalism are not in the first
instance susceptible to the moral reading, perhaps the accumulation of
case law interpreting such requirements successfully obscures the underlying historical compromises. American courts do not typically entertain
challenges to the institution of the Senate or to the idea of federalism;
145. But cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale LJ. 1131,

1132, 1201 (1991) (noting but disagreeing with accepted idea of Bill of Rights as separate
from Constitution).
146. If a legal system is so thoroughly- rotten that it has no principled core, then
Dworkin would authorize the judge to lie about what the law is. See Dworkin, Law's
Empire, supra note 4, at 102-08 (discussing Nazi law).
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rather, they entertain disputes concerning what federalism entails. At the
least, Dworkin's methods would require that the courts act in a principled
manner in resolving such disputes. The question Dworkin does not address, however, is whether it is possible to give a principled interpretation
to a provision that is unprincipled at its core.
The hot-button issues of the 1980s and early 1990s form the backdrop for Freedom's Law. These issues-abortion, the right to die, free
speech, and affirmative action, to name the most prominent-show no
sign of going away, and thus the insights contained in Freedom's Law remain highly relevant today. 147 Freedom's Law also points the way to a
more widely applicable method. The above analysis leaves one hoping to
see Dworkin apply his considerable talents to a moral reading of the entire Constitution.
CONCLUSION

In both the opening and concluding pages of Freedom'sLaw, Dworkin
sets forth an argument that turns the counter-majoritarian difficulty on
its head. The prominent role that courts play in our political culture,
Dworkin argues, does not generate flaccid debate within an apathetic
public. 148 To the contrary, because American courts are a forum of principle, they focus public debate on arguments of principle (pp. 30-31,
343-47). He speculates that our public debates about civil rights and
abortion, for example, despite their bitterness, have addressed the issues
more deeply than they would have by political mechanisms alone (p. 31).
The case for improved public debate through judicial prominence is
necessarily speculative. We can compare American institutions to foreign
ones, but we can conduct no controlled experiments. Without Brown v.
Board ofEducation,what would race relations now look like? Who can say?
In at least one respect, though, Freedom'sLaw as well as Law and Truth
constitute evidence for Dworkin's thesis that America's extensive reliance
on courts enhances public debate. Neither book would have been written were it not for the prominent role our courts play in public affairs.
That would have been a great loss.

147. In an essay published shortly after Freedom's Law, Dworkin continues to focus on
questions of liberty and equality. See Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y.
Rev. of Books, Aug. 8, 1996, at 44 (discussing Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), Quill
v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), and Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.d 790
(9th Cir. 1996)).
148. Dworkin attributes the claim he denies to Learned Hand (pp. 342-43). For
recent versions of the argument, see Daniel Lazare, supra note 144, at 1-10; Mary Ann
Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 24, 33-39, 45 (1987).

